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WILL THE "SUNSET" ON THE AMERICAN
DREAM? TWO YEARS OF EXPERIENCE UNDER
THE MORTGAGE SUBSIDY BOND TAX ACT
I. Introduction
The main problem in housing today is not availability, but afforda-
bility.' During the 1970's, housing demand for both residential and
investment purposes caused the prices of homes to rise at a rate in
excess of increases in the Consumer Price Index.2 This price rise,
coupled with high interest rates, has had a severe impact on low and
moderate income homebuyers who have been unable to afford financ-
ing from conventional lenders. 3 In the late 1970's, state and local
housing finance agencies (HFAs) responded to these conditions by
1. THE REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON HOUSING xxii (March 1982)
[hereinafter cited as THE PRESIDENT'S REPORT]. The Report presents the findings of a
30 member Commission established in June, 1981 by President Reagan to study
options for the development of a national housing policy in the areas of housing
assistance for low income people, homeownership, rental housing, housing finance,
and housing regulations. See also U.S. DEP'T OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT,
THE PRESIDENT'S NATIONAL URBAN POLICY REPORT 31 (1982) (problems of housing
availability are decreasing, but problems of housing affordability continue to esca-
late) [hereinafter cited as H.U.D. Report]; 1981-82 Miscellaneous Tax Bills, X:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Taxation and Debt Management of the Comm. on
Finance, United States Senate, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 265 (1981) (statement of Richard
K. Helmbrecht, President, Council of State Housing Agencies) (in 1970, the cost of a
new home was approximately $23,000 and interest rates were about 8%; by 1980,
prices increased 250% and interest rates rose to approximately 15% and above)
[hereinafter cited as 1981 Hearing].
2. THE PRESIDENT'S REPORT, supra note 1, at xxv. Homes became a way of
saving, not only a place to live. As prices rose however, those unable to make such a
heavy commitment to savings were unable to acquire homes. Id.
3. Id. Between 1963 and 1973, the initial monthly mortgage payment as a
percentage of household income for people buying homes remained stable at approxi-
mately 24-34%. Id. As home prices and interest rates increased, the figure rose to
55% in 1980. Id. Existing homeowners were protected from rising interest rates by
fixed rate mortgages. Id. The resale value of their homes helped to set off increases in
taxes, maintenance and fuel bills. Id. See also H.U.D. REPORT, supra note 1, at 4 ("By
the end of the 1970's, the problem of housing affordability increased as the percent-
age of income devoted to housing rose for both owners and renters."); 1981 Hearing,
supra note 1, at 265 (statement of Richard K. Helmbrecht) ( "New mortgage financ-
ing techniques and double wage earner households will keep homeownership within
reach of many middle income households, however, most moderate and all low
income households will be priced out of the market").
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issuing single-family mortgage bonds to finance mortgage loans for
single-family homebuyers. 4
4. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE: THE MORTGAGE SUBSIDY BOND TAX ACT OF
1980: EXPERIENCE UNDER THE PERMANENT RULES iX (March 1982) [hereinafter cited as
CBO 1980 REPORT]. Today, nearly all states have some form of HFA. See, e.g.,
ALASKA STAT. §§ 18.56.010-210 (1981 & Supp. 1982); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 19-
3080.1.-.24 (1980 & Supp. 1981); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 50900-53113
(West 1979 & Supp. 1983); CoLo. REV. STAT. §§ 29-4-701 to -733 (1977 & Supp.
1982); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 8-241 to -265c (1981 & Supp. 1982); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 31, §§ 4301-4322 (1975 & Supp. 1980); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 45-2101 to -2205
(1981 & Supp. 1982); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 420.501 to .515 (West Supp. 1983); GA.
CODE ANN. §§ 8-3-170 to -189 (1982 & Supp. 1982); HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 356-1 to
-306 (1976 & Supp. 1982); IDAHO CODE §§ 67-6201 to -6225 (1980); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 67 1/2, §§ 301-334 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982-1983); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 5-20-1-1
to -2-18 (Burns 1983); IowA CODE ANN. §§ 220.1-.43 (West Supp. 1982-1983); KAN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 12-5219 to -5235 (1982) (not a state HFA but authorizes local housing
revenue bond activity); KY. REV. STAT. §§ 198A.010-.250 (1982); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 40.581.1 to -.41 (West Supp. 1983) ME. REV. STAT. tit. 30, §§ 4601-A to
-4783 (1978 & Supp. 1982-1983); MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, §§ 266DD-1 to -8 (1982);
MASS. ANN. LAWS (Selected Spec. Laws) chs. L.C. 5, L.C. 7 (Michie/Law. Co-op.
1979 & Supp. 1983); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 125.1401 to -.1496 (1976 & Supp.
1982-1983); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 462A.01 to .24 (Supp. 1983); MISS. CODE ANN. §§
43-33-501 to -583 (1981 & Supp. 1982); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 215.010 to -.250 (Vernon
Supp. 1983); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 90-6-101 to -127 (1981); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 76-
1601 to -1651 (Cum. Supp. 1980 & Supp. 1981); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 319.010 to -.400
(1979-1981); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 204C: 1 to :55 (Supp. 1981); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§ 17:1B-4 to -25 (West Supp. 1982-1983); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 58-18-1 to -27
(1982); N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAW §§ 2400-2429B (McKinney 1981 & Supp. 1982-1983);
N.C. CEN. STAT. §§ 122A-1 to -23 (1981 & Supp. 1981); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 54-17-
01 to -32 (1982); (Oklahoma Public Trust Act) OKLA. STAT. tit. 60, §§ 176-180.4
(West 1971 & Supp. 1982-1983)(not an HFA, but allows bonds); OR. REV. STAT. §§
456.550 to .720 (1981); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 1680.101 to .508(a) (Purdon 1977
& Supp. 1982-1983); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 31-3-110 to -160 (Law. Co-op. 1977 &
Supp. 1982); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. 11-11-1 to -185 (1982); TENN. CODE ANN. §§
13-23-101 to -206 (1980 & Supp. 1982); TEX. REV. STAT. ANN. art. 12691-6 to -10
(Vernon Supp. 1982-1983); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 63-44(a)-i to -20 (1978 & Supp.
1981); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 601-643 (Supp. 1982); VA. CODE §§ 36-55.24 to .52
(1976 & Supp. 1982); W.VA. CODE §§ 31-18B-1 to -18B-12 (1982); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§§ 234.01 to .55 (West Supp. 1982-1983); WYo. STAT. §§ 9-18-101 to -125 (1977 &
Supp. 1982). The HFAs are represented as a group by the Council of State Housing
Agencies. See generally 1981-82 Miscellaneous Tax Bills XV, Hearing before Sub-
comm. on Taxation and Debt Management of the Comm. on Finance, United States
Senate, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 165 (1982) (statement of Robert S. Moyer, Director,
Delaware Housing Authority) (The Council represents 46 states, the District of
Columbia and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico) [hereinafter cited as 1982 Hear-
ing]. As of October, 1982, only the states of Arizona, Kansas, Ohio, and Washington
did not have HFAs. 10 Hous. & DEv. REP. (BNA) 412 (Oct. 11, 1982); see also
COUNCIL OF STATE HOUSING AGENCIES, 1982 SURVEY OF STATE HOUSING FINANCE
AGENCIES 5, 22, 54, 71 (1983) [hereinafter cited as 1982 SURVEY]. To date, 47 states
have issued single-family mortgage revenue bonds. Id. at 1-75. See also THE PREsI-
DENT'S REPORT, supra note 1, at 169 (as of that time, 46 states had issued). The
District of Columbia has enabling legislation but has yet to issue bonds. See 1982
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In a typical single-family housing program, the issuer sells bonds
and uses the proceeds to purchase mortgages originated for low and
moderate income families by traditional lending institutions.- The
mortgages purchased bear a rate of interest that is slightly higher than
the yield paid by the issuer to the bondholders." The same financial
institution that originates the mortgage loan usually collects the
monthly mortgage payments from the borrower, 7 which are eventu-
ally used to retire the bonds.8 Since the interest earned on qualifying
bonds is exempt from federal taxation," the issuer can pay bondholders
a lower yield than is available on competing taxable securities.' 0 This
SURVEY, supra, at 14. The State of Kansas can issue only general obligation bonds, not
revenue bonds. Id. at 22. The Governor of Washington has approved a bill to create
an HFA in the State of Washington. Id. at 71. The Constitution of the State of Ohio
was amended on November 2, 1982, by popular vote (53 %) to allow a single family
mortgage revenue bond program. Id. at 54.
5. See, e.g., STATE OF OREGON HOUSING FINANCE REVENUE BONDS, OFFICIAL
STATEMENT 8-10 (Sept. 23, 1982) [hereinafter cited as OREGON OFFICIAL STATEMENT];
NEBRASKA MORTGAGE FINANCE FUND, OFFICIAL STATEMENT 16-18 (Aug. 10, 1982)
[hereinafter cited as NEBRASKA OFFICIAL STATEMENT]; OKLAHOMA HOUSING FINANCE
AGENCY, OFFICIAL STATEMENT 1-2 (Dec. 1, 1981) [hereinafter cited as OKLAHOMA
OFFICIAL STATEMENT]; see MissoUW HOUSING DEVELOPMENT COMMISSION, ELEVENTH
ANNUAL REPORT 1982, at 4 [hereinafter cited as MISSOURI ANN. REP.]; IDAHO HOUSING
AGENCY ANNUAL REPORT 1980-81, at 4; NEBRASKA MORTGAGE FINANCE FUND ANNUAL
REPORT 9 (1982) [hereinafter cited as NEBRASKA ANN. REP.].
6. The Act sets a maximum limit of 1.125% on the differential between the
yield paid on the bonds and the rate of return realized by the issuer on the mortgages
(including certain expenses and fees). The Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act
of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248 § 220(a)(3), reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 154 (Supp. No. 7)(codified at I.R.C. § 103A(i)(2) (West Supp. No. 3.1982)
[hereinafter cited as TEFRA].
7. R. FORBES, P. FISCHER & A. FRANKLE, AN ANALYSIS OF TAx-EXEMPT MORT-
GAGE REVENUE BONDS 11 (Municipal Finance Study Group, School of Business, State
University of New York at Albany, May 1979) (making the ongoing borrower/lender
relationship identical with the standard mortgage transaction) [hereinafter cited as
R. FORBES]. See, e.g., OREGON OFFICIAL STATEMENT, supra note 5, at 13-14; NE-
BRASKA OFFICIAL STATEMENT, supra note 5, at 18-19; OKLAHOMA OFFICIAL STATE-
MENT, supra note 5, at 1.
8. The receipts are usually turned over to a trustee who passes an agreed
amount through to the bondholders at pre-determined intervals. See R. FORBES,
supra note 7, at 11. See, e.g., OREGON OFFICIAL STATEMENT, supra note 5, at 16-21;
NEBRASKA OFFICIAL STATEMENT, supra note 5, at 13-14; OKLAHOMA OFFICIAL STATE-
MENT, supra note 5, at 9-11. See generally MissouRu ANN. REP., supra note 5, at 4.
9. I.R.C. § 103A (Supp. V 1981).
10. Note, Tax-Exempt Mortgage Revenue Bonds: Another Case of "Opiate
Economics?", 11 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 473, 474 (1980) (tax-exemption allows HFAs to
market bonds at lower interest rates); see also R. KORMENDI & T. NAGLE, THE
INTEREST RATE AND TAX REVENUE EFFECTS OF MORTGAGE REVENUE BONDS 5 (University
of Chicago, Apr. 1980) [hereinafter cited as R. KORMENDI] (high tax bracket investors
are most willing to accept a lower yield in return for the exemption; low bracket
investors are usually unwilling to forego higher yields on taxable securities for the
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ability to borrow in the tax-exempt market reduces the issuer's cost of
borrowing funds. The benefit realized by the issuer is passed on to
participating homebuyers in the form of discounted mortgage rates."
To the extent an interest rate differential exists between program
mortgage loans and mortgage loans available from conventional
lenders, bond-financed homeowners receive an indirect, non-cash
benefit from the federal government, 2 which is deprived of the reve-
nues on the interest income paid to the single-family bondholders.' 3
In 1980, Congress passed the Mortgage Subsidy Bond Tax Act (the
Act), 1 4 which placed new and far-reaching restrictions on the issuance
of tax-exempt bonds to finance single-family homes. '5 The Act amends
the Internal Revenue Code by adding section 103A, which, with
certain exceptions, generally denies a tax exclusion for the interest
earned on single-family mortgage revenue bonds.' 6 The exceptions
benefit of the tax exemption); R. FORBES, supra note 7, at 8 (lower interest rates
prevail in the tax-exempt market).
11. R. FORBES, supra note 7, at 8; THE PRESIDENT'S REPORT, supra note 1, at 170.
When tax-exempt yields are sufficiently below taxable ones, bond-financed mort-
gages will significantly reduce the cost of financing homeownership. See, e.g., COLO-
RADO HOUSING FINANCE AUTHORITY ANNUAL REPORT 1981, at 3. This is the fundamen-
tal purpose of mortgage revenue bond programs. See R. FORBES, supra note 7, at 8.
See generally 1981 Hearing, supra note 1, at 108 (statement of John E. Chapoton,
Dep't of Treasury).
12. R. FORBES, supra note 7, at 2 (tax-exempt mortgage revenue bonds reduce
the interest rate paid by homeowners on their mortgages).
13. See notes 16-18 infra and accompanying text.
14. Pub. L. No. 96-499, §§ 1100-1110, 94 Stat. 2599, 2660-2681 (1980).
15. See notes 51-63 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the Act's
restrictions. Transitional rules provide that in general, the restrictions on the use of
mortgage subsidy bonds would not apply to bonds issued prior to January 1, 1981, if
the proceeds of the bonds were committed to purchasers within one year from the
date of issuance. Pub. L. No. 96-499, § 1104(a)(2), 94 Stat. 2670 (1980). Exceptions
to this rule were provided if the governing body, having authority to issue the
obligations, took official action to issue the bonds before April 25, 1979. Id § 1104(b),
94 Stat. at 2670-72.
16. I.R.C. § 103A(a)(Supp. V 1981). Generally, interest on any bond is not tax-
exempt if a significant portion of the proceeds is to be used to finance mortgages on
single-family housing. Id. § 103A(b)(1). The Act also amended I.R.C. § 103 to
provide that interest on an industrial development bond (IDB), substantially all of
the proceeds of which are used to provide mortgage financing for a qualified residen-
tial rental property, is exempt from federal income taxation. Pub. L. No. 96-499, §
1103, 94 Stat. 2669-70 (1980) (codified at I.R.C. § 103(b)(4)(A)(Supp. V 1981). A
project will be treated as a qualified residential rental property only if 20 % (15 % in
targeted areas) or more of the units in the project are to be occupied by individuals of
low or moderate income at all times during the qualified project period. TEFRA §
221(a); I.R.C. § 103(b)(4)(A)(West Supp. No. 3 1982). The focus of this Comment is
on single-family mortgage bonds and not industrial development bonds for residen-
[Vol. XI
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provided are for qualified mortgage bonds issued before January 1,
1984,17 and qualified veterans' bonds,' 8 which meet the requirements
set forth in the Act. A "sunset provision" of the Act denies tax-exempt
status to all single-family bonds issued after December 31, 1983,11
with the exception of qualified veterans' bonds.20 Consequently, the
Act will prohibit tax exempt revenue bond-financed programs for
single-family homeowners after 1983.21
This term Congress must decide whether to extend the provisions of
the Act and allow the continued but restricted use of single-family
revenue bonds, or let their tax-exempt status expire at its appointed
date. 22 This Comment will examine the validity and effectiveness of
selected major provisions of the Act which are unique to single-family
mortgage revenue bonds. The analysis is based on two years of experi-
ence by HFAs issuing bonds since the passage of the Act. The Com-
ment begins by tracing the development of events leading up to the
passage and amendment of the Act. Next, it evaluates whether certain
tial rental property. It should be noted, however, that the Mortgage Subsidy Bond
Tax Act does to some extent regulate the use of IDBs for residential rental property.
17. I.R.C. § 103A(b)(2)(a)(Supp. V 1981). A mortgage bond is qualified if it
meets the requirements set forth in the Act and is issued prior to January 1, 1984. Id §
103A(c)(1)(B).
18. Id § 103A(b)(2)(B). A qualified veteran's mortgage bond is a bond secured
by the general obligation of a state which is part of an issue in which substantially all
of the bond proceeds are used to finance residences for veterans. Id. § 103A(c)(3) (a).
Both the principal and interest on the bonds must be secured by the general obliga-
tion of the state. Id. § 103A(c)(3)(b).
19. Id. § 103A(c)(1)(B). See Section IV of this Comment for a discussion of the
constitutionality of the sunset provision.
20. I.R.C. § 103A(c)(3)(Supp. V 1981). The Act exempted state general obliga-
tion veterans' programs from the mortgage revenue bond restrictions including the
sunset provision. Id. For this reason, veterans' mortgage bonds are not discussed in
this Comment.
21. See, e.g., MICHIGAN STATE HOUSING DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, 1982 AN-
NUAL REPORT 4; Missoum ANN. REP., supra note 5, at 1. These state issuers have
indicated that the continuation of mortgage revenue bond programs for single-family
housing is contingent upon the bonds maintaining their tax-exempt status.
22. Several bills have been introduced in both the House of Representatives and
the Senate to either extend or completely repeal the sunset provision. S.137 was
introduced by Sen. Roth to eliminate the sunset provision. 129 CONG. REC. S619
(daily ed. Jan. 26, 1983). Two similar bills were introduced in the House: H.R. 1176
(129 CONG. REC. H289 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 1983)) and H.R. 1772 (129 CONG. REC.
H774 (daily ed. March 2, 1983)). S.733 was introduced by Sen. Domenici to postpone
the sunset until 1990. 129 CONG. REC. S2433 (daily ed. March 9, 1983). In the House,
H.R. 1185 was proposed by Rep. Hammerschmidt to repeal the entire Mortgage
Subsidy Bond Tax Act. 129 CONG. REC. H289 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 1983)). H.R. 1533,
introduced by Rep. McEwen, is a proposal to extend the sunset provision 5 years. 129
CONG. REC. H579 (daily ed. Feb. 17, 1983).
1983]
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sections have been successful in accomplishing their intended purpose.
Finally, it discusses the application of the constitutional doctrine of
inter-governmental tax immunity to the sunset provision of the Act to
determine whether Congress possesses the authority to eliminate the
tax-exemption for all single-family mortgage revenue bonds.
II. Legislative History of the Mortgage Subsidy Bond Tax Act
In the late 1950's, state housing finance agencies became very active
selling tax-exempt bonds to finance multi-family housing. 23 Prior to
1968, the interest on all state and local bonds was exempt from federal
income taxation regardless of the government's intended use of the
proceeds.2 4 In 1968, the Revenue Expenditure and Control Act of
196825 amended section 103 of the Internal Revenue Code to provide
that, with certain exceptions, tax exempt status would be denied to
industrial development bonds (IDBs) issued on or after January 1,
1969.28 One of the exceptions to this rule provided tax-exempt status to
IDBs issued to finance residential real property for family units.27 No
23. See COUNCIL OF STATE HOUSING AGENCIES, THE HISTORY OF TAx-EXEMPT
FINANCING FOR HOUSING DEVELOPMENT 1-7 (undated). This report traces the increase
in financing activity of state and local tax-exempt housing bond programs. It begins
with an account of New York's 1955 Mitchell-Lama program, continues with the
jointly subsidized federal and state multi-family rental programs of the 1960's and
1970's, and concludes with the development of single-family HFA activity of the
1980's.
24. I.R.C. § 103(a)(1964). Congress limited the tax-exempt status of state and
municipal bonds for the first time in 1968. In response to the widespread use of
industrial development bonds, Congress imposed limitations on IDBs used for certain
purposes. Revenue and Expenditure Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-364, §
107(a), 82 Stat. 251, 266-68 (1968). Restrictions were placed on arbitrage bonds in
1969. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 601, 83 Stat. 487, 656-57
(1969).
25. Pub. L. No. 90-364, 82 Stat. 251 (1968).
26. Id. § 107, 82 Stat. at 266-68. The Act defined industrial development bonds
as an issue "all or a major portion of the proceeds of which are to be used directly or
indirectly in any trade or business carried on by any person who is not . . . a
governmental unit, or an organization . . . exempt from tax under § 501(a)..." of
the Internal Revenue Code. Pub. L. No. 90-364, § 107(a)(c)(1)-(3), 82 Stat. 251, 266-
67 (1968). Exceptions were provided for certain exempt activities, industrial parks,
and small issue bonds. Id. § 107(a)(c)(4)-(6), 82 Stat. at 267-68. The Congressional
Budget Office contends that these activities serve only "quasi-public" purposes be-
cause much of the benefit enures to individuals or corporations. See CONGRESSIONAL
BUDGET OFFICE, 9 6 TH CONG., IST SESs., TAX-EXEMPT BONDS FOR SINGLE-FAMILY
HOUSING 2 (Comm. Print April 1979) [hereinafter cited as CBO 1979 REPORT].
27. Pub. L. No. 90-364, § 107(a), 82 Stat. 251, 267 (1968) (codified at I.R.C. §
103(b)(4)(A) (1976)). The section was subsequently amended by the Mortgage Sub-
sidy Bond Tax Act to provide an exception only for certain limited forms of residen-
tial rental property. Pub. L. No. 96-499, § 1103(a), 94 Stat. 2660, 2669-70 (1980)
[Vol. XI
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distinction was made between IDBs issued for multi-family rental
housing and those issued for single-family owner-occupied resi-
dences. 28 Thus, the Revenue Expenditure and Control Act 2 19 did not
affect the issuance of tax-exempt housing bonds.
The 1970's brought a shift in tax-exempt mortgage bond financing
away from multi-family housing. 30 HFAs placed a growing emphasis
on accommodating low and moderate income persons in the market
for single-family homes. 31 In 1976, the volume of state and local tax-
exempt single-family bond issues was approximately $700 million. 32 In
1979, volume rose to approximately $7.8 billion, and in 1980, volume
soared to $10.5 billion. 33 Between 1976 and 1979, the percentage of
(codified at I.R.C. § 103(b)(4)(A) (Supp. V 1981)). See note 16 supra for an explana-
tion of the current provision.
28. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1533, 90th Cong. 2nd Sess., reprinted in 1968 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2341, 2383-84. Although the brief explanation in the
conference report refers only to multi-family housing, single-family homes were not
specifically excluded. Id. They probably were never considered by the conferees since
states did not begin to issue these bonds until 1970. CBO 1979 REPORT, supra note 26,
at 3 n.2.
29. Pub. L. No. 90-364, § 107, 82 Stat. 251, 267 (1968).
30. CBO 1979 REPORT, supra note 26, at xiii. The Congressional Budget Office
report commented that state agencies have "recently shifted their efforts sharply
toward single-family housing, much of it in suburban areas and much of it aimed at
middle-income families." Id. See also THE PRESIDENT'S REPORT, supra note 1, at 169-
70 (until 1979, virtually all HFA activity focused on multi-family housing).
31. CBO 1979 REPORT, supra note 26, at xiii. The first tax-exempt bonds for
owner-occupied housing were issued in California after World War I. CBO 1980
REPORT, supra note 4, at 2. Shortly after World War II, Oregon issued bonds to
provide veterans with below-market-rate mortgage loans. Id. "In the early 1970's,
state housing agencies started issuing bonds to finance mortgages on single-family
housing for all state residents of low- or moderate-income." Id. In 1978, "62% of
new state agency tax-exempt bond issues were for single-family housing, up from
26% in 1975." CBO 1979 REPORT, supra note 26, at xiii. 1978 also marked the
beginning of heavy activity by local issuers in the single-family bond market. Nine-
teen localities in seven states issued about $550 million of these bonds. Id. at 1. Then,
in the first quarter of 1979, 32 localities in 12 states issued an additional $1 billion of
single-family bonds. Id.
32. THE PRESIDENT's REPORT, supra note 1, at 170 (Table 12.3). The volume of
state and local single-family tax-exempt revenue bonds rose sharply from $700 mil-
lion in 1976, to $1 billion in 1977, $3.4 billion in 1978, $7.8 billion in 1979, and $10.5
billion in 1980. Id.
33. Id. The passage of the Act greatly distorted 1980 single-family bond volume
figures. Investment bankers and issuers feared the potentially adverse impact of the
federal restrictions on their ability to issue housing bonds and rushed to market
single-family bonds they believed might be their last. Quint, Sellers of Mortgage
Bonds Race Curbs, N.Y. Times, Nov. 29, 1980, at DI, col. 3. Bonds which were
issued at the end of 1980 to avoid the restrictions of the Act inflated the yearly
volume figure. Daily Bond Buyer, Jan. 7, 1981, at 1, col. 2. In December alone, 83
issues were brought to market amounting to $3.63 billion, approximately one-half
the 1979 total. Daily Bond Buyer, Jan. 19, 1981, at 1, col. 2.
1983]
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bonds issued for owner-occupied housing rose from 1.8 % of the total
state and local bond market to 20.4 % .14 The proliferation of single-
family bonds began to raise doubts about the propriety of using tax-
exempt bonds to finance residential mortgages that were thought to
often benefit middle-income persons. 35
In an attempt to control the issuance of single-family bonds, the
House of Representatives passed the Mortgage Subsidy Bond Tax Act
of 1979;36 the bill, however, did not clear the Senate. Eventually, a
34. H.R. REP. No. 1167, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 445, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE
CONG. & An. NEWS 5526, 5808 (Table 2). (The table represents the percentage
distribution of purposes for which tax-exempt bonds were issued by state and local
governments between 1976 and 1979. The figure cited includes bonds issued for both
single and multi-family housing.)
35. 68 Fed. Res. Bull. 138-39 (March 1982) (the Act was passed principally to
eliminate benefits being realized by middle-income households and to prevent the
potential loss of tax revenue to the Treasury). See also THE PRESIDENT'S REPORT, supra
note 1, at 170 (in some instances, single-family bonds have been issued to middle-
income families). The overwhelming majority of housing finance agencies, however,
operate for the purpose of providing housing for persons of low and moderate rather
than middle-income. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.56.010 (1981); ARK. STAT. ANN. §
19-3080.1 (1980); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 50952(a) (West 1979 & Supp.
1983); COLO. REV. STAT. § 29-4-702(1)(1977); CONN. STAT. § 8-242 (1981); D.C.
CODE § 45-2101(a)(1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 420.502(4) (West Supp. 1983); GA.
CODE ANN. § 8-3-171(b)(1982 & Supp. 1982); IND. CODE ANN. § 5-20-1-1 (Burns
1983); IOWA CODE ANN. § 220.2(1) (West Supp. 1982-1983); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 12-
5220 (1982); Ky. REV. STAT. § 198A.020(1)(1982); MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, §
266(a)(1) (1982) (limited income); MASS. ANN. LAWS (Selected Spec. Laws) ch. L.C.
5, §§ 1-18 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1979 & Supp. 1983); MICH. CoMp. LAWS ANN. §
125.1401 (1976 & Supp. 1982-1983); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 462A.02(1) (West Supp.
1983); Miss. CODE ANN. § 43-33-503(a)(1981); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 215.030(1)(Vernon
Supp. 1983); NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1603 (Cumm. Supp. 1981); NEV. REV. STAT. §
319.020(1)(1979-1981); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:lb-5.1 (West Supp. 1982-1983); N.D.
CENT. CODE 54-17-07.3(1)(1982); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 1680.102(1)(1977); S.D.
CoIFIED LAWS ANN. § 11-11-1(1)(1982); TENN. CODE ANN. § 13-23-102(1) (1980);
TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1269L-6, § 3d; UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-44a-2 (1978);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 622(7) (Supp. 1982); VA. CODE § 36-55.25(a)(1976 & Supp.
1982); W. VA. CODE § 31-18-2 (1982); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 234.04(1)(West Supp.
1982-1983).
Some HFAs provide housing only for persons of low income. See, e.g., DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 31, § 4301(8)(b) (1975); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 30, § 4601-A(1)(b)(1978 &
Supp. 1982-1983); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-18-2(A)(1982); N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAW. §
2401 (McKinney 1981); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122A-2(1981). Hawaii's program is open
to all residents of the state. HAW. REV. STAT. § 356-1 (1976 & Supp. 1982).
Virginia has a provision whereby a city may determine that in providing safe and
sanitary residential housing, it is necessary and desirable to provide housing to
persons of other than low and moderate incomes. VA. CODE § 36-55.25(e),(f)(Supp.
1982). The validity of this provision was upheld in Infants v. Virginia Hous. Dev.
Auth., 221 Va. 659, 670-75, 272 S.E.2d 649, 655-59 (1980).
36. This was one of two predecessor versions of the Act. H.R. 5741, 96th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1979), was passed by the House on Mar. 26, 1980. 126 CONe. REC. H2237
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modified version of the House Bill was enacted-The Mortgage Sub-
sidy Bond Tax Act of 1980. 37
(daily ed. Mar. 26, 1980). The Mortgage Subsidy Bond Tax Act of 1979 was accom-
panied by a committee report. H.R. REP. No. 678, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979),
which was subsequently reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 1167, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 434,
reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5526, 5797. The earliest version of
the Act was H.R. 3712, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
37. Pub. L. No. 96-499, §§ 1100-1104, 94 Stat. 2660-81 (1980). The Act was a
modified version of the House bill, and was inserted as a revenue measure into the
Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1980. Pub. L. No. 96-499, 94 Stat. 2599 (1980). These
Acts were signed into law on December 5, 1980. 126 CONG. REC. D1546 (daily ed.
Dec. 5, 1980).
Imposition of the Act had a dramatic impact on bond volume. Due to uncertainties
regarding several of its provisions, few single-family bonds were issued in 1981 before
November. CBO 1980 REPORT, supra note 4, at 5; see also Daily Bond Buyer, Mar.
13, 1981, at 3, col. 3 (lack of treasury regulations makes it difficult for bond counsel
to provide an opinion on the tax-exempt status of single-family issues). The main
reason for these uncertainties and the resultant delay was that temporary regulations
were not.issued by the Treasury until Nov. 5, 1981. Id. See also THE PRESIDENT'S
REPORT, supra note 1, at 170 (technical problems and lack of regulations caused the
decline in bond volume in 1981). Those single-family bonds that did come to market
were mostly exempted from the Act by transitional rules. See I.R.C. §
103A(g)(7)(Supp. V 1981); see also note 15 supra for operation of transitional rules.
These rules allowed certain issues in progress at the time the Act was enacted to be
marketed free of restrictions. CBO 1980 REPORT, supra note 4, at 5. See also THE
PRESIDENT's REPORT, supra note 1, at 170 (as of March, 1982, virtually no single-
family bonds had been issued since the Act was imposed, with the exception of issues
already in progress).
The Act came under immediate criticism by members of Congress who believed it
was too severe and contrary to congressional intent. Various Senators criticized the
Act, complaining that it: "[V]irtually shut down the mortgage ... bond mar-
ket .... " 127 CONG. REC. S5936 (daily ed. June 9, 1981) (statement of Sen.
Bumpers); "meant to tighten up eligibility requirements and limit the overall level of
such issues, [instead] the restrictions have put a complete stop to the housing bond
programs across the country... ," id. at 5938 (statement of Sen. Pryor); and that it
"contained a number of provisions which inadvertently made it impossible for state
and local governments to issue tax-exempt mortgage revenue bonds .. " 127 CONG.
REC. S10,280 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1981) (statement of Sen. Sasser). For contrary
views, see 1982 Hearing, supra note 4, at 72-74 (statement of John E. Chapoton,
Treasury Dept.)(contending that high interest rates, rather than provisions of the
Act, were responsible for inhibiting bond volume); see also 1981 Hearing, supra note
1, at 100 (statement of Sen. Dole)(high interest rates and a variety of financial
variables probably had more of an influence on reduced bond volume than the
provisions of the Act).
Opponents of the Act contended that it was wrought with restrictions that pre-
vented state and local governments from marketing single-family bonds because
states feared that a violation of any provision would cause the bonds to lose their tax-
exempt status. See, e.g., 127 CONG. REC. S5934 (daily ed. June 9, 1981)(statement of
Sen. Sasser proposing legislation to remove what he perceived to be various technical
problems contained in the Act). The imposition of the Act's restrictions (see notes 51-
63 infra and accompanying text for discussion of the Act's restrictions) was considered
by some members of Congress to be particularly untimely due to the tight money
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Primarily, Congress intended to curtail revenue losses suffered by
the Treasury because of high tax bracket investors who purchase the
bonds as a means of escaping taxation on interest income. 38 Congress
questioned whether tax-exempt financing was an efficient method of
"subsidizing" housing. 39 Another concern was that states and localities
could, by issuing bonds, circumvent the federal budget appropriations
process by providing funds for housing which were not originally
allocated by the Congress as direct expenditures. 40 Moreover, Con-
policy the Federal Reserve had recently adopted. This fiscal policy sent interest rates
to record high levels and sent homes sales plummeting. See 1981 Hearing, supra note
1, at 67 (statement of Sen. Carl Levin); 127 CONG. REC. S5936 (daily ed. June 9,
1981)(statement of Sen. Bumpers)(single family mortgage bonds are necessary due to
the Federal Reserve's tighter control on credit, which sent housing prices and interest
rates to record high levels).
In August of 1981, the Treasury Department issued temporary guidelines which
provided definitional certainty about the provisions of the Act for the first time. 46
Fed. Reg. 34,314-25 (1981)(codified at 26 C.F.R. § 103A (1982)). In November,
1981, one of the regulations was amended. 46 Fed. Reg. 55,514 (1981). This amend-
ment served to clarify the rule that 95% of the mortgagors must meet the Act's
eligibility requirements, in order for the bonds to qualify as tax-exempt. The amend-
ment replaced an absolute 95% standard with one that allows an issuer to rely in
good faith upon certification by the mortgagor, seller, and loan originator that each
party complied with particular requirements of the Act. Treas. Reg. § 6a.103A-
2(c)(1982). See note 54 infra. As a result, the marketability of the bonds improved
since bond counsel could once again provide unqualified opinions as to the tax-
exempt status of single-family bonds. See Daily Bond Buyer, Nov. 23, 1981, at 1, col.
3; see also 1981 Hearing, supra note 1, at 258 ( "[a]t the present time ... our bond
underwriters [said] it would be difficult-if not impossible to successfully market our
bonds with a qualified opinion ...")(statement of Grady Haynes, Chairman of
Tennessee Housing Development Agency); Daily Bond Buyer, Sept. 2, 1981, at 1,
col. 2 (Public Securities Association claimed that uncertainty prevented counsel from
providing unqualified opinions that mortgage revenue bond interest is tax-exempt).
The definitional certainty provided by the regulations and a slight drop in interest
rates resulted in a flurry of activity in the fourth quarter of 1981. CBO 1980 REPORT,
supra note 4, at 5. Nevertheless, volume for 1981 was approximately $3 billion, down
by more than $7 billion from the previous year. See notes 88-103 injra and accompa-
nying text for a discussion of volume limitations; see note 32 supra for 1980 single-
family volume figure. See also COUNCIL OF STATE HOUSING AGENCIES, IN SUPPORT OF
MORTGAGE REVENUE BONDS 1 (undated)(estimating that volume for 1981 was about
15% of the congressionally imposed limit).
38. H.R. REP. No. 1167, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 446, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5526, 5808-09. The Report states that high income individuals
are the main purchasers of tax-exempt bonds. As they escape taxation, other taxpay-
ers who do not purchase municipal bonds become dissatisfied with the country's
income tax system. Id.
39. See note 48 infra for a discussion of the efficiency of mortgage revenue
bonds as a means to finance single-family housing.
40. H.R. REP. No. 1167, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 446, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 5526, 5809. In the opinion of Congress, tax exemptions for
housing have the same impact on the federal budget system as direct expenditures by
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gress believed that too large a supply of single-family bonds would
increase the interest rates of other municipal obligations forced to
compete in the bond market. 41
At least three bills were introduced into the Senate in 1981 and 1982
to ease the restrictions of the Act.4 2 Many recommendations of the
proposed bills were incorporated into the Tax Equity and Fiscal Re-
sponsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA) .43 TEFRA amended and liberalized
the Act in certain important respects. 44 Congress considered the relax-
ation of single-family bond restrictions allowed by TEFRA to be the
least costly and most effective way to channel temporary assistance to
the distressed housing industry. 45 The liberalized provisions, however,
the federal government. Id. Prior to the Act, the federal government could control
direct federal housing expenditures for budgetary purposes, while it could not control
the volume of state housing bond issues. Id. As a result, reductions in the budget for
direct housing expenditures were being negated by an uncontrolled' increase in tax-
exempt housing bond volume. Id.
41. Id. at 447, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. &AD. NEWS at 5810. See also
Daily Bond Buyer, Sept. 30, 1981, at 1, col. 3 (memorandum released by the United
States Office of Management and Budget states that proliferation of single-family
issues drove up the cost of municipal borrowing for other projects). Congress also
observed that the percentage of total fixed investment devoted to residential purposes
in this country was already higher than most other countries. H.R. REP. No. 1167,
96th Cong., 2d Sess. 446, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5526,
5809. Any additional increase would come at the expense of other forms of invest-
ment. Id. at 446-47, reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5809-10.
42. Sen. Sasser introduced S.1348, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. S5934
(daily ed. June 9, 1981), and proceeded to obtain wide bipartisan support from 25
co-sponsors. 127 CONG. REC. S10,280 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1981); Sen. Durenberger
introduced S.1656, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981), 127 CONG. REC. S10,345 (daily ed.
Sept. 23, 1981), and Sen. Roth introduced S.2425. See 1982 Hearing, supra note 4, at
14.
43. Pub. L. No. 97-248, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS (Supp.
No. 7).
44. The maximum arbitrage spread (see notes 59-63 infra and accompanying
text) between the yield on a bond and the mortgage interest rate it subsidizes was
increased to 11/s% from 1%. TEFRA § 220(a)(1)(codified at I.R.C. § 103A
(i)(2)(West Supp. No. 3 1982)). The maximum purchase price (see notes 110-22 infra
and accompanying text) for homes located in targeted areas was raised from 110 % to
120% of the average area purchase price. TEFRA § 220(d)(2) (codified at I.R.C. §
103A(f)(5)(West Supp. No. 3 1982)). Only 90% of borrowers using mortgage bonds
need to be first-time homebuyers (see notes 104-09 infra and accompanying text), a
decrease of 10% from the old rule (100%). TEFRA § 220(c)(1)(codified at I.R.C. §
103A(e)(1)(West Supp. No. 3 1982)).
45. S. REP. No. 494, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 184, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 3, 165-66 (Supp. No. 7). To provide this assistance, the regula-
tions were relaxed in order to ensure that the volume of mortgage subsidy bonds
would increase toward its maximum limit in each state. Id. Congress acknowledged
that in order to attain their objective, it would be necessary to dilute the original
purpose of the Act, which was to direct the financing to those individuals whom
Congress deemed to have the greatest need. Id.
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are only a temporary measure. On December 31, 1983, the Act's
sunset provision will terminate the tax-exempt status of all single-
family mortgage revenue bonds.
46
III. The Mortgage Subsidy Bond Tax Act
A. Purpose of the Act
The purpose of the Mortgage Subsidy Bond Tax Act is "to direct the
subsidy from the use of tax-exempt bonds for owner occupied housing
to those individuals who have the greatest need for the subsidy, 47 to
increase the efficiency of the subsidy, 48 and to restrict the overall
revenue loss from the use of tax-exempt bonds49 for owner occupied
46. I.R.C. § 103A(c)(l)(B)(Supp. V 1981). See Section IV of this Comment for a
discussion of the constitutionality of this provision.
47. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1479, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 171, reprinted in 1980
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5903, 5955. See notes 55-58 infra and accompanying
text for a discussion of mortgage eligibility requirements which direct the "subsidy"
to those individuals with the greatest need.
48. H.R. CONF. REI'. No. 1479, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 171, reprinted in 1980
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5903, 5955. Congress was concerned with the effi-
ciency of using tax-exempt bonds to finance owner-occupied single-family housing.
H.R. REP. No. 1167, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 446, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 5526, 5809. The Act includes arbitrage restrictions designed to increase the
efficiency of these bonds by limiting the amount of administrative and issuance costs
which can be passed on to the mortgagor. Id at 436-46, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5799-809. See notes 59-63 infra and accompanying text for a
discussion of arbitrage. Opponents of mortgage revenue bonds contend that they are
an inefficient vehicle for the financing of single-family housing since the revenue loss
to the federal government significantly exceeds the interest cost savings to those
receiving the subsidy. Department of the Treasury, Treasury News, May 21, 1982, at
10; see also CBO 1979 REPORT, supra note 26, at 47-55. (Treasury revenue loss
estimates for projected single-family bond volume); Daily Bond Buyer, Sept. 30,
1981, at 1, col. 3 (Treasury regards tax-exempt financing as inefficient).
For an opposing view, largely discrediting Treasury estimates, see R. KORMENDI,
supra note 10, at 29 (arguing that Congressional Budget Office and Treasury calcula-
tions of the interest rate and tax revenue effects of mortgage revenue bonds are
inaccurate due to an over-simplified view of capital markets and erroneous statistical
procedure); see generally J. EssER, MORTGAGE REVENUE BONDS . . . EFFICIENT OR
INEFFICIENT?, (Sept. 13, 1979)(Director of Liaison, Municipal Finance Officers Asso-
ciation) (acknowledging and analyzing the wide variation in cost/benefit estimates);
R. FORBES, supra note 7, at 2-5 (adopting a middle ground between Treasury/CBO
figures and those of Kormendi and Nagle).
49. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1479, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 171, reprinted in 1980
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5903, 5955. This is accomplished mainly by limiting
the volume of single-family bonds which a state may issue in any given year. See
notes 88-103 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of volume limitations.
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housing." 50 To effectuate this purpose, the Act imposes substantial
requirements and restrictions on the financing of home mortgage
loans by an issuer of tax-exempt obligations.
B. The Act's Restrictions
The Act's restrictions may be grouped into three distinct categories.
First, there are general restrictions placed upon the issuer. These
include: (1) volume limitations on the amount of bonds a state may
issue in any given year, 5' (2) a mandatory allocation of a portion of
the bond proceeds for the purpose of originating mortgage loans in
targeted areas,52 (3) a requirement that all bonds be issued in regis-
tered form as opposed to bearer form ,53 and (4) a requirement that
the issuer in good faith, attempt to make sure that all of the program
borrowers meet the Act's eligibility requirements.5 4
Second, there are mortgage eligibility requirements for individuals
receiving program loans. The mortgage eligibility requirements in-
50. See H.R.CONF. REP. No. 1479, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 171, reprinted in 1980
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs 5903, 5955.
51. I.R.C. § 103A(h)(Supp. V 1981); Treas. Reg. § 6a.103A-2(b)(6)(1982).
52. I.R.C. § 103A(h)(Supp. V 1981); Treas. Reg. § 6a.103A-2(h)(1982). See
notes 65-87 infra and accompanying text for a complete discussion of the Act's
targeted area provisions.
53. I.R.C. § 103A(j)(Supp. V 1981); Treas. Reg. 6a.103A-l(a)(5)(1982). Tax-
exempt bonds were previously issued in bearer form, and the interest was paid to the
holder of the bond. This created an opportunity for the evasion of estate and gift
taxes or for laundering funds from illicit activities since there was no record of
ownership maintained by the issuers. H.R. REP. No. 1167, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 446,
reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs 5526, 5813.
54. An issue of bonds meets mortgage eligibility requirements only if the issuer
in good faith attempts to make sure that the borrower has met all the eligibility
requirements before the mortgage deed is executed. I.R.C. § 103A(c)(2)(B)(i)(Supp.
V 1981); Treas. Reg. § 6a.103A-2(c)(1)(i)(1982). Ninety-five percent of the lendable
proceeds of an issue used to make home mortgage loans must be devoted to financing
residences which meet the mortgage eligibility requirements at the time the mort-
gages are executed or assumed. I.R.C. § 103A(c)(2)(B)(ii)(Supp. V 1981); Treas. Reg.
§ 6a.103A-2(c)(1)(ii) (1982). To determine whether 95% of the proceeds were used
for qualifying mortgages, § 103A permits the issuing authority to rely on an affidavit
of the borrower and of the seller certifying compliance with the eligibility require-
ments and on copies of the borrower's federal income tax returns from three years
preceding the date on which the mortgage is executed. Id. Even if the relevant
information in such affidavits is ultimately proven to be untrue, the requirements
will have been met unless the Agency or the participating lender knows or has reason
to believe the borrower's information was false. 46 Fed. Reg. 55,514 (1981). If it is
untrue, however, the correction requirement must be met. Treas. Reg. § 6a.103A-
2(c) (1) (iii) (1982).
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clude:(1) purchase price limitations, 5 (2) a restriction that the mort-
gage loans be used to purchase principal residences for individuals
who have had no ownership interest in a home within the past three
years, 56 (3) a prohibition on the refinancing of existing mortgages,5 7
and (4) rules governing the assumability of these mortgages.,
Finally, there are arbitrage restrictions. 5 These restrictions require
that the yield on a bond-financed mortgage not exceed the yield paid
by the issuer to bondholders by more than 1.125 % points.6 0 Also, the
interest profits that can be earned from the temporary investment of
bond proceeds in other securities is limited6" and must be passed
through to either the mortgagors6 2 or to the federal government.6 3
The single biggest problem in evaluating the provisions of the Mort-
gage Subsidy Bond Tax Act is the relatively small number of bond
offerings that have been issued subject to its provisions. Although
55. I.R.C. § 103A(f)(Supp. V 1981); Treas. Reg. § 6a.103A-2(f)(1982). See
notes 110-22 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of purchase price limita-
tions.
56. I.R.C. § 103A(e)(Supp. V 1981); Treas. Reg. § 6a.103A-2(e)(1982). See
notes 104-09 infra and accompanying text. An exception to the three-year require-
ment is provided in the case of loans made in targeted areas. See note 76 & 111 infra
and accompanying text.
57. Proceeds from a bond-financed mortgage loan may not be used to refinance
or replace an existing loan, with the exception of temporary initial financing in
certain situations. I.R.C. § 103A(j)(2)(A)(Supp. V 1981); Treas. Reg. § 6a.103A-
2(j)(1982). Agencies may acquire or replace construction loans, bridge loans or other
similar temporary financing existing for 24 months or less. I.R.C. § 103A(j)(2)(B)
(Supp. V 1981); Treas. Reg. § 6a.103A-2(j)(2)(1982).
58. The Act provides that home mortgage loans may not be assumed unless the
principal residence, first-time homebuyer and purchase price requirements are met
by the assuming purchaser at the time of the assumption. I.R.C. § 103A(j)(3)(Supp.
V 1981); Treas. Reg. § 103A-2(j)(3)(1982).
59. Generally, arbitrage restrictions limit the extent to which an issuer may
temporarily invest bond proceeds in investments which earn a yield higher than that
offered on the bonds. See generally Note, The IRS's Application of Arbitrage Provi-
sions: Overregulation of Municipal Finance, 10 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 659,(1982) for a
complete discussion of the development and current application of the Internal
Revenue Code's arbitrage provisions. This Comment does not discuss arbitrage re-
strictions at great length because most of the restrictiveness of the Act's arbitrage
rules was eliminated by TEFRA. See note 37 supra.
60. TEFRA § 220(a)(1), (3)(codified at I.R.C. § 103A(i)(2)(West Supp. No. 3
1982)).
61. I.R.C. § 103A(i)(Supp. V 1981); Treas. Reg. § 6a.103A-2(i)(1982). Further-
more, bond proceeds allocated to reserves and other non-mortgage investments must
be decreased as the debt owing on the mortgage is repaid. I.R.C. § 103A
(i)(3)(A)(ii)(Supp. V 1981); Treas. Reg. § 6a.103A-2(i)(3)(i)(B)(1982).
62. I.R.C. § 103A(i)(4)(A),(D)(Supp. V 1981); Treas. Reg. § 6a.103A-
2(i) (4)(i)(1982).
63. Treas. Reg. § 6a.103A-2(i)(4)(v)(1982).
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enacted in December 1980, bonds regulated by the Act were not
issued until November 1981 .64 As a result, this Comment must evalu-
ate the effectiveness of the Act, based on a limited amount of actual
experience. In this short time, however, certain provisions of the Act
have raised controversy because they are either too restrictive and
exclude groups of people in need of assistance, have arbitrarily fa-
vored certain jurisdictions, or have been counter-productive in achiev-
ing their intended purpose.
C. The Controversial Provisions
1. Targeted Areas
The purpose of allocating funds for targeted areas is to promote the
economic growth and revitalization of remote, underdeveloped, or
blighted areas of a state. There are two kinds of targeted areas;
qualified census tracts and areas of chronic economic distress
(ACEDs).65 The former is decided solely on the basis of 1980 census
median income data. Qualified census tracts are those census tracts
within a state in which seventy percent or more of the families have an
income of eighty percent or less of the statewide median family in-
come.66 ACEDs are designated voluntarily by a state and approved by
the Department of Housing and Urban Development6 7 and the Trea-
sury Department on the basis of criteria relating to substandard hous-
ing stock, resident economic need, the potential use of owner financ-
ing to improve housing conditions, and whether the area has coverage
under a housing assistance plan.68
The Act requires that an issuer of single-family mortgage bonds
make available, for at least one year, a minimum of twenty percent of
the lendable proceeds of each bond issue to originate mortgages in
targeted areas.69 Alternatively, an issuer may reserve for targeted
areas forty percent of the average annual volume of mortgage loans
originated in targeted areas within its jurisdiction during the preced-
ing three years (forty percent market share) .70 This forty percent
64. See note 37 supra (reasons for delay).
65. Treas. Reg. § 6a.103A-2(b)(3)(1982).
66. Id § 6a.103A-2(b)(4).
67. Id § 6a.103A-2(b)(5)(i).
68. Id § 6a.103A-2(b)(5)(iii)(A)-(D). The regulations provide that a state must
file the supporting information for a proposed ACED designation with the Assistant
Secretary of Housing. Id. § 6a.103A-2(b)(5)(iv),(v).
69. I.R.C. § 103A(h)(1)(Supp. V 1981); Treas. Reg. § 6a.103A-2(h)(2)(i)(1982).
70. I.R.C. § 103A(h)(2)(Supp. V 1981); Treas. Reg. § 6a.103A-2(h)(2)(ii)(1982).
Congress provided this alternative to make sure that the 20% provision did not
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market share option may allow an issuer to reserve substantially less
than twenty percent of its total bond proceeds. This occurs when
targeted areas within an issuer's jurisdiction have generated very few
mortgages over the previous three years. 71 For instance, in Alaska, the
only targeted area consists of federal land where there has been no
mortgage financing during the relevant three year base period.7 2 As a
result, the state is not required to set aside any bond proceeds for
targeted area loans. 73 Therefore, the forty percent market share provi-
sion allows some states to defeat the purpose of the targeted area
requirement by allocating very few funds from a bond issue for these
mortgage loans.7 4
The Act provides two incentives to encourage issuers to increase the
amount of funds they reserve for targeted areas. It relaxes some of the
Act's restrictions in targeted areas by increasing maximum purchase
price limitations on houses located in these areas, 75 and by eliminating
the requirement that eligible mortgagors be first-time homebuyers. 76
On the other hand, there are disadvantages. Lenders often have to be
persuaded to originate mortgage loans in targeted areas for sale to
require an issuer to set aside more money for targeted areas than could be utilized.
H.R. REP. No. 1167, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 449, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 5526, 5812. By reserving funds, an issuer designates a portion of the bond
proceeds as being available for one year exclusively for the commitment of mortgage
loans in targeted areas. Treas. Reg. § 6a.103A-2(h)(i)(1982). During the one year
period, the issuer must use reasonable diligence to commit the reserved proceeds to
mortgage loans in targeted areas. Id. § 6a.103A-2(h)(ii). If the issuer has used
reasonable diligence, and reserved bond proceeds still remain uncommitted, the
funds may be used to orginate ordinary mortgage loans.
71. See CBO 1980 REPORT, supra note 4, at xiv.
72. ALASKA HOUSING FINANCE CORP., OFFICIAL STATEMENT 22 (Sept. 1, 1982).
73. Id.
74. CBO 1980 REPORT, supra note 4, at xiv. The Congressional Budget Office
examined 31 official statements and reported that only seven would allocate the full
20% of lendable funds for targeted areas). Ten reserved no funds, twelve reserved
between 0% and 20% and two were ambiguous. Id. at 36-37. See also Table I at
note 84 infra (survey of the portion of proceeds states intend to reserve from their
most recent issue for loans in targeted areas).
75. See note 111 infra and accompanying text. By increasing the purchase price
limit, the number of residences eligible for mortgage bond financing within targeted
areas is increased.
76. I.R.C. § 103A(e)(2)(A)(Supp. V 1981); Treas. Reg. § 6a.103A-2(e)(2)(i)
(1982). The revitalization of targeted areas, however, necessitates encouraging indi-
viduals to return to city areas after they have already owned homes. H.R. REP. No.
1167, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 448, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
5526, 5811. Removing the first-time homebuyer requirement expands the pool of
eligible mortgagors. Since more residences and more borrowers become eligible for
the program, an issuer can more easily commit the bond proceeds reserved for
targeted area loans.
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single-family programs. 77 This presents a problem for the issuer be-
cause the faster the agency is able to spend the bond proceeds on
mortgage loans, the more secure the terms of the investment for
bondholders. 8 It is these mortgage payments that supply the main
source of revenue for principal and interest payments on single-family
bonds. 79
To minimize the delay in committing bond proceeds to targeted
area mortgage loans, some issuers have taken advantage of the forty
percent market share option to reduce the number of targeted loans
they are required to make in economically depressed areas.80 This
enables them to commit their bond proceeds to mortgage loans more
quickly and increases the security of their mortgage portfolios.8 As a
result, the risk of investment to a prospective bond purchaser is re-
duced. A smaller reserve for targeted area loans translates into an
improved credit rating for the single-family bonds, and allows the
issuer to offer a lower yield to bondholders which reduces the issuer's
cost of borrowing.8 2 Generally, investors will accept a lower rate of
return (yield) on a more secure investment. It would appear, there-
fore, that jurisdictions with a large number of targeted areas are
placed at a disadvantage compared with more affluent jurisdictions
having fewer targeted areas.8 3 This latter group can often reduce its
cost of borrowing by exercising the forty percent market share option
77. CBO 1980 REPORT, supra note 4, at 36 (stating that this puts jurisdictions
with many targeted areas at a disadvantage; generally, problems stem from the fact
that these loans are not considered as secure as regular loans).
78. See R. ROSENBERG, SINGLE FAMILY MORTGAGE BONDS, HAS VOLUME ExcEEDED
DEMAND? 1-2 (Drexel, Burnham, Lambert, Inc., Oct. 6, 1982). This study assesses
the loan origination status of certain single-family issues and concludes that some
issuers will have to "call" their bonds since they are encountering difficulty in
committing bond proceeds to mortgage loans. The report states that: "The degree to
which there is risk of bonds being called is directly related to the degree to which an
issuer can originate single-family mortgage loans from bond proceeds in the time
period allocated." Id. at 1. See also Note, supra note 10, at 476 (the extent to which
single-family bonds are collateralized by mortgages contributes to favorable bond
rating); Daily Bond Buyer, Oct. 6, 1982, at 1, col. 3; 23, col. 2 (underwriters and
investors concerned about the slow rate at which bond proceeds being committed to
mortgage loans; if bonds called at par amount, investors lose the gain they had
anticipated).
79. See notes 7-8 supra and accompanying text.
80. See generally note 74 supra and accompanying text.
81. See note 78 supra and accompanying text; see also R. ROSENBERG, supra note
78, at 2 (mortgage origination time is essential to the security of single-family bonds).
82. See Note, supra note 10, at 476 (favorable bond ratings enable cities to
market bonds at a lower interest rate).
83. See CBO 1980 REPORT, supra note 4, at xiv, 36.
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and setting aside fewer than twenty percent of its bond proceeds for
targeted areas. 84
84.
TABLE I
Percentage of Range of
Lendable Purchase Price
Funds 1981 Per Capita Safe Harbor Income
Set Aside Bonding Limitations Limitations
for Targeted Authority (in dollars)c (in
State AreasJA) (in dollars),, New Existing thousands)A)
AL 51 66,500 52,700 37
AK 0%(D) 500 117,400 91,200 2 5 . 6 5 -
32.65%
AZ 75 49,100- 43,100-
107,600 84,200
AR 87 66,500 59,700 30
CA 40% 94 65,000- 58,900- 22.7-45.75
143,400 123,500
CO 20% 107 69,300- 57,200- 23
81,400 85,400
CT 20% 64 72,000- 65,100- 24.-40.2,,,
152,900 149,200
DE 15% 336 54,600- 53,100- 37.5
70,500 60,400
DC 313 109,100 101,900
FL 16% 63 60,800- 43,900- 30.5-35.4)
88,800 96,900
CA 20-40% 37 61,600- 48,400- 26.9-37.5
89,200 67,000
HI 20% 207 127,700 110,000
ID 212 91,300 74,400 28.5
IL 55 71,400- 48,000- 35.3
88,400 74,900
IN 20%(E 40 62,600- 35,800- 35.5
79,300 56,000
IA 69 55,500 47,500 24.9733
KS 85 64,000- 47,500-
67,000 78,200
KY 55 65,900- 49,600- 19.5
84,500 51,300
LA 48 73,900- 57,600- 40
92,300 74,800
ME 178 56,000 54,200 27
MD 57 51,900- 65,600- 28.99-33
78,000 76,300
MA 1.8 1%(l 35 64,700- 51,300- 22-31.5
78,900 70,600
MI 39 73,100- 51,800- 31.75
110,500 60,100
MN 4%(c) 59 70,900- 56,900- 23-32
93,700 74,200
MS 79 61,800 43,700 35
MO 45 57,300- 44,900- 28-32
88,100 64,700
MT 254 64,500 60,800 34.5-38.5
NE 0.1% (H) 127 51,900- 41,800- 32.5
65,200 50,200
NV 5% 250 89,100 57,900 23.75-39.25
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TABLE I (cont'd)
Percentage of
Lendable
Funds
Set Aside
for Targeted
AreaSIAI
20%
3%
20%
20 % (Z)
20%
20%
20%
1981 Per Capita
Bonding
Authority
(in dollars),B
217
43
154
24
34
306
50
66
76
36
211
64
290
44
54
137
391
58
58
103
43
425
1982 SURVEY, supra note 4, at 1-75.
I 1980 CBO REPORT, supra note 4, at 34-35.
(c Rev. Proc. 83-5, 1983-4 I.R.B. 18-20 (Jan. 24, 1983).
(Di See text accompanying notes 72-73 supra.
(E) INDIANA HOUSING FINANCE AUTHORITY, OFFICIAL STATEMENT 18 (April 6, 1982).
Massachusetts is setting aside $3.62 million of a $200 million issue, but mortgage lenders are
required to reserve 40% of the issue for the first three months for high priority loans. See
MASSACHUSETTS HOUSING FINANCE AGENCY, OFFICIAL STATEMENT 10 (Aug. 10, 1982).
(C) Minnesota is reserving $1.7 million of a $41.9 million issue. See MINNESOTA HOUSING FINANCE
AGENCY, OFFICIAL STATEMENT 12 (Aug. 1, 1982).
, Nebraska has set aside $100,000. of an $89.4 million issue. See NEBRASKA OFFICIAL STATE-
MENT, supra note 5, at 17.
o1 See OKLAHOMA OFFICIAL STATEMENT, supra note 5, at 14.
0) ALASKA HOUSING FINANCE CORPORATION, OFFICIAL STATEMENT, 16 (Sept. 9, 1982).
( CONNECTICUT HOUSING FINANCE AUTHORITY, OFFICIAL STATEMENT 11 (Sept. 10, 1982).
(L) FLORIDA HOUSING FINANCE AGENCY, OFFICIAL STATEMENT 6 (June 1, 1982).
'" NORTH DAKOTA HOUSING FINANCE AGENCY, OFFICIAL STATEMENT 10 (July 15, 1982).
WISCONSIN HOUSING FINANCE AUTHORITY, OFFICIAL STATEMENT 14 (Dec. 1, 1982).
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Range of
Purchase Price
Safe Harbor
Limitations
(in dollars)c,
New Existing
57,000 85,900
77,400- 67,600-
114,200 94,200
83,600 52,300
62,600- 36,700-
120,000 84,500
65,700- 41,300-
79,400 62,900
64,500 60,800
77,000- 51,800-
123,000 64,800
80,100- 55,200-
90,900 72,600
79,100- 60,300-
90,600 73,200
51,800- 36,400-
90,600 55,000
69,900 48,300
67,200- 51,700-
80,400 67,000
64,500 60,800
65,200- 51,700-
78,100 69,400
73,100- 50,900-
102,200 96,200
61,900- 55,100-
74,200 60,500
56,000 54,200
57,000- 53,100-
87,200 54,300
77,300- 57,100-
88,000 81,100
56,000 50,900
70,100 51,200
64,500 60,800
State
NH
NJ
NM
NY
NC
ND
OH
OK
OR
PA
RI
SC
SD
TN
TX
UT
VT
VA
WA
WV
WI
WY
Income
Limitations
(in
thousands)(A)
40
30
None
19.5-23.5
33(m)
38.5-42
25.5
35
32.5
28.
31.5
30
30-38
31.5-33.5
32.5
18-33
32.7
23.3-34(,,)
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As a matter of policy, issuers with few qualified census tracts are
encouraged to petition the government for additional ACED designa-
tions to increase the number of targeted areas within their jurisdic-
tions."5 The additional designations assure that issuers who are pres-
ently reserving less than twenty percent of their bond proceeds for
targeted areas will commit a greater percentage of the proceeds from
future bond issues to areas that are in need of revitalization. In
practice, however, issuers with few qualified census tracts are discour-
aged from attempting to designate new target areas (ACEDs) because
of the added costs of holding aside additional proceeds for targeted
area loans. Although some incentives are provided to encourage issu-
ers to set aside additional funds for targeted areas,86 they do not offset
the increased cost of borrowing associated with targeted loans.8 7
2. Volume Limits
The Act limits the volume of single-family bonds that each state is
allowed to issue annually. 8 A state may choose for its volume limita-
tion $200 million,89 or nine percent of the annual volume of state
It is difficult to ascertain exactly how much money from each bond issue is set aside
for targeted areas. Official statements are often ambiguous and state they will be in
compliance with the targeted area restriction but fail to indicate with which of the
two alternatives they intend to comply: the 20 % provision, or the 40 % market share
provision. A recent survey conducted by the Council of State Housing Agencies
(along with supplemental information supplied by this author) indicates that of 20
states explicitly designating the amount of money they intend to reserve for targeted
area loans, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, Hawaii, Indiana, New
Hampshire, New York, Oklahoma, Texas, Virginia and West Virginia intend to
reserve at least 20% of their proceeds for targeted area loans. See Table I supra.
States reserving less than 20% include: Delaware, 15%; Florida, 16%; Nevada, 5%,
and New Mexico, 3 %. Id. States reserving less than 20 %, but who have expressed the
amount in terms of absolute dollar figures, rather than percentages of bond proceeds,
include Massachusetts, Minnesota and Nebraska. Id. Approval of targeted areas in
the State of Maryland is still pending. See 1982 SURVEY, supra note 4, at 28. Alaska is
not required to reserve any funds for targeted areas. See text accompanying notes 72-
73 supra.
85. Issuers are provided with incentives to originate mortgages in targeted areas.
See notes 75-76 supra and accompanying text.
86. See notes 75-76 supra and accompanying text.
87. CBO 1980 REPORT, supra note 4, at xiv (the value of increased purchase
prices and removal of the first-time homebuyer requirement is small in comparison
with the costs of setting aside additional funds for targeted areas). See also 10 Hous.
& DEv. REP. (BNA) at 103 (July 5, 1982)(only four applications by states requesting
an increase in their number of targeted areas were being processed; states which
submitted applications were Michigan, Mississippi, New Hampshire and Tennessee).
88. I.R.C. § 103A(g)(Supp. V 1981); Treas. Reg. § 6a.103A-2(g)(1982).
89. I.R.C. § 103A(g)(4)(b)(Supp. V 1981); Treas. Reg. § 6a.103A-2(g)(6)(i)(b)
(1982).
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mortgage originations averaged over the previous three years, 0
whichever provides for a greater bonding authority. Congress created
this limitation due to its concern that a very large revenue loss would
result if single-family bond volume was not curtailed.9' Congress also
did not want volume to increase to a level where bond-financed
mortgages represented a substantial portion of the overall mortgage
market. 2 In addition, Congress observed that the proliferation of
single-family bonds had driven up the interest rates on municipal
bonds9 3 issued for other purposes.
One problem with the Act's volume limitations is that they favor
sparsely populated states.9 4 It stands to reason that very populous
states with a large volume of mortgage activity during the previous
three years will choose the nine percent option if it provides for a
bonding authority in excess of $200 million. By the same token, a
smaller state, with less mortgage activity during the relevant three
year period will opt for the $200 million limit because it often pro-
90. I.R.C. § 103A(g)(4)(A)(Supp. V 1981); Treas. Reg. § 6a.103A-2(g)(6)(i)(A)
(1982). To determine the amount of bonds it may issue in any given year, a state may
rely on "safe harbor" limits published by the Internal Revenue Service which place a
ceiling on the volume of single-family bonds that each state can issue. Treas. Reg. §
6a.103A-2(g)(6)(iii)(1982). See, e.g., Rev. Proc. 81-31, 1981-2 C.B. 555-57 (1981)
(1981 safe harbor volume limits per state); Rev. Proc. 82-44, 1982-31 I.R.B. 44
(Aug. 2, 1982)(1982 safe harbor volume limits per state). Alternatively, a state may
use its own data to calculate this percentage if it is more accurate. Treas. Reg. §
6a. 103A-2(g)(6)(iii)(1982).
91. See H.R. REP. No. 1167, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 450, reprinted in 1980 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5526, 5813. The original House provision allowed for
volume in each state of $50 million or 5 % of the average annual volume of statewide
mortgage originations during the previous three years, whichever was greater. This
provision was amended in Conference to reflect the current allowable figures. H.R.
CONF. REP. No. 1479, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 174-76, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5903, 5958-60. Of the 50 states and the District of Columbia, 37
currently have safe harbor volume limits of $200 million. Those having greater limits
include (in millions): Arizona, $226; Colorado, $293; Florida, $675; Illinois, $495;
Maryland, $229; Michigan, $279; New Jersey, $304; New York, $443; Ohio, $438;
Pennsylvania, $381; Texas, $767; Virginia, $229; Washington, $236. The largest is
California with $1.943 billion. Rev. Proc. 82-44, 1982-31 I.R.B. 45.
92. H.R. REP. No. 1167, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 450, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5526, 5813. One reason for the limitation is to prevent conven-
tional lenders from having to compete with issuers who can offer mortgage loans at
lower rates of interest due to the advantage of tax-exempt financing. Id.
93. Id. at 447, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5810. As tax-
exempt mortgage bond volume grows, it has a tendency to increase rates of interest
on all bonds. Id. As a result, the cost of borrowing for other state and municipal
projects is increased. Id.
94. CBO 1980 REPORT, supra note 4, at xii (stating however that volume limits
were not a problem in 1981, since only two states exercised their entire bonding
quota).
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vides for bonding authority well in excess of nine percent of its three-
year average."' This formula, therefore, favors smaller states to the
extent that $200 million exceeds nine percent of a state's three-year
average of mortgage activity. These less populous states possess an
advantage in terms of relative bonding authority over more populous
states whose best choice is limited to the nine percent option.
A second problem with the formula used to compute nine percent of
a state's mortgage volume activity is that it is counter-cyclical. The
formula uses mortgage origination statistics compiled during the three
immediately preceding years. 96 Therefore, beginning in the second
year of a housing recession, volume figures from the recession year
immediately preceding the year of issuance replace volume figures
from three years prior, presumably a better year for housing and
mortgage activity.9 7 This problem is compounded in subsequent years
because recession statistics are substituted for figures from better
years. As a result, states who use the nine percent formula have their
95. Relative bonding authority can be calculated for each state using the $200
million limit by computing what percent of the three-year average of total mortgage
originations $200 million represents. This computation has not been conducted on a
statewide basis. In 1981, however, a report conducted by the Congressional Budget
Office determined the amount of per capita bonding power existing in each state.
CBO 1982 REPORT, supra note 4, at 34-35 (information included in Table I, supra
note 84). This was determined by dividing each state's volume limitation by the
population as determined by the 1980 census. The results illustrate the extent to
which sparsely populated states have an advantage, in terms of per capita bonding
authority, over the most populous states who generally choose the option allowing for
9 % of their three-year average of mortgage volume activity. The State of Alaska had
the most bonding power, equal to $500 per resident. Other states with high per
capita bonding power included: Wyoming, $425; Vermont, $391; Delaware, $336;
North Dakota, $306. The state with the lowest rate of per capita bonding power was
New York with $24 per resident. Other states with low bonding power included:
North Carolina, $34; Massachusetts, $35; Indiana, $40; Pennsylvania, $36; Georgia,
$37; Michigan, $39; New Jersey, $43; Wisconsin, $43; Tennessee, $44, and Missouri,
$45. Id. See Table I, supra note 84.
96. For example, to calculate the safe harbor volume limitations for the year
1981, mortgage activity from the years 1978, 1979 and 1980 were tabulated and
averaged. Rev. Proc. 81-31, 1981-2 C.B. 555. In 1982, states' mortgage volume
figures for 1981 replaced the figures from 1978, and the relevant years became 1979,
1980 and 1981. Rev. Proc. 82-44, 1982-31 I.R.B. 44.
97. The problem is illustrated by the reduction in safe harbor limitations be-
tween the years 1981 and 1982. In 1982, volume figures from 1981, a bad year in
housing, replaced those from 1978, a good year in housing. As a result, the average
volume over the three-year period was reduced in those states using the 9 % computa-
tion and the safe harbor limitation figures diminished proportionately. 1982 Mort-
gage Bond Limits For States Reflect Housing Downturn, 10 Hous. & DEv. REP.
(BNA) at 148-49 (July 19, 1982) (giving a breakdown by state of increases and
decreases between the 1981 and 1982 state safe harbor volume limitations).
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bonding authority reduced during recessionary periods when they
need it most.98 This also increases the disparity in per capita bonding
authority, already discussed, which exists between sparsely and
densely populated states. This is because the three-year averaging
methodology only reduces volume limits in populous states choosing
the nine percent option. 9 In a less populous state whose volume
limitation remains $200 million, there is no reduction in per capita
bonding authority in recessionary years.
Volume limitations also fail to take into account the extent to which
residents of each state depend upon their HFA as a source of mortgage
financing. The most pronounced example of this occurs in Alaska.
Even though the rate of per capita bonding authority in Alaska is
higher than that of any other state,100 its volume ceiling still may not
be high enough. Alaska residents are forced to rely heavily upon their
HFA for home mortgage loans because it is the largest source of
mortgage financing in the state.'10
Finally, volume limitations may be responsible for an artificial
supply of single-family bonds. This is due to the fact that any surplus
in a state's yearly bonding allocation may not be carried over into the
next year.102 Therefore, at the end of 1981, issuers struggled to market
bonds in an attempt to exhaust their yearly bonding quota. 0 3 In this
instance issuers were pressured to market their bonds prematurely and
the volume limitations actually increased instead of limiting the sup-
ply of single-family bonds. This would appear to be the opposite result
of what Congress intended the provision to accomplish.
98. For example, 1982 safe harbor volume figures dropped in fifteen states, down
a total of $683.2 million from 1981. Id. at 148. The most significant decreases (in
millions) occurred in California, down $274.6; Illinois, down $137.2; Ohio, down
$102; and Michigan, down $83.7. Id. at 148. Other states whose volume ceilings
dropped included Colorado, Georgia, Indiana, Maryland, Minnesota, Missouri, New
Jersey, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Washington. Id. at 148-49. The only increases
(in millions) occurred in Florida, up $60.1; New York, up $30.1; and Arizona, up
$22.5. Id. at 148. Ceilings in other states remained at $200 million. Id.
99. Per capita bonding authority is calculated by dividing a state's volume limita-
tion by its population. See note 95 supra. If the volume limitation in a state is
reduced, per capita bonding authority decreases proportionately.
100. See Table I, supra note 84.
101. ALASKA HouSINc FINANCE CORPORATION, SELECTED CORPORATION AND PRO-
GRAM INFORMATION 1 (Sept. 1982)(stating that the activities of the Alaska HFA
constitute "practically the entire Alaskan mortgage market").
102. Treas. Reg. § 6a.103A-2(g)(6)(1982).
103. See Daily Bond Buyer, Nov. 23, 1981, at 1, col. 4.
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3. First-Time Homebuyer Requirement
The three-year requirement, commonly referred to as the first-time
homebuyer rule, provides that after deducting the proceeds used to
make loans in targeted areas, ninety percent of the lendable proceeds
of a bond issue must be used to originate mortgages for persons who
have had no ownership interest in a principal residence during the
three years prior to the date on which the mortgage is executed.10 4
Congress believed that individuals with the greatest need for program
loans were those of low and moderate income who have difficulty in
procuring mortgage money and a down-payment for their first
home. 105 People with existing homes were thought to have sufficient
equity to enable them to purchase another home with conventional
financing. 10
This restriction may operate to discriminate unfairly against per-
sons who have previously owned mobile homes, lived in substandard
housing, or have been displaced by condemnation or natural disas-
ter.107 Since the Act itself does not provide income limitations for
homebuyers,108 states will sometimes have below-market-rate mort-
gages available for affluent or upwardly mobile first-time purchasers
while truly destitute families who have previously owned homes and
are unable to obtain conventional financing would not qualify.109 The
first-time homebuyer requirement, therefore, operates unfairly to the
extent that it favors persons who are not truly in need of mortgage
financing over those who are.
4. Purchase Price Limitations
The Act restricts the price of residences purchased with bond-
financed mortgages. The acquisition cost of a residence financed must
104. TEFRA § 220(c)(1)(codified at I.R.C. § 103A(e)(West Supp. No. 3 1982)).
105. H.R. REP. No. 1167, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 447, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWs 5526, 5810.
106. Id. at 448, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs at 5811.
107. CBO 1980 REPORT, supra note 4, at 39. See also 1981 Hearing, supra note 1,
at 45 (hearing was conducted on a tax bill, S.1348, which included a proposed
amendment to the Act providing exceptions to the first-time homebuyer rule for
individuals whose homes had been made uainhabitable due to disaster or govern-
mental action); 1982 Hearing, supra note 4, at 34 (hearing on a bill with similar
provisions introduced by Sens. Roth and Tsongas).
108. See notes 123-28 infra for a discussion of state imposed income limitations.
109. See CBO 1980 REPORT, supra note 4, at 39. It is the contention of these
impoverished and displaced people that a purchase price limit alone would accom-
plish much of the intent of the first-time homebuyer rule and relieve a great deal of
the administrative burden of checking income tax returns for interest deductions on
previous mortgages. Id.
[Vol. XI
MORTGAGE REVENUE BONDS
not exceed 110% of the average area purchase price in the standard
metropolitan statistical area (SMSA) in which it is located. 10 In the
case of targeted areas, the applicable percentage is 120 %.1" Purchase
price limitations are crucial to prevent the program from being used
to subsidize luxury homes. 112 Throughout the country, price limita-
tions vary widely.11 3 Average area purchase prices are used due to
these variations. The average area purchase price of single-family
residences in any given area is determined by the Treasury Depart-
ment using the most recently available statistical data of homes pur-
chased during the previous twelve month period." 4 The Internal
Revenue Service issues safe-harbor purchase price figures1 5 which are
relied on by most issuers to avoid the cost of gathering their own
statistical information as to average area purchase prices." 6 The pur-
chase price determinations for SMSAs are made separately for new
and previously occupied residences. 117
110. TEFRA § 220(d)(1)(codified at I.R.C. § 103A(f)(1)(West Supp. No. 3 1982)).
SMSAs are those areas "in and around a city of 50,000 inhabitants or more (or
equivalent area)" as defined by the Secretary of Commerce. Treas. Reg. § 6a.103A-
2(b)(6)(1982).
111. TEFRA § 220(d)(2)(codified at I.R.C. § 103A(f)(5)(West Supp. No. 3 1982)).
The increased price limitation is an incentive to encourage homeowners to purchase
homes in targeted areas. See note 75 supra and accompanying text.
112. H.R. REP. No. 1167, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 448, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5526, 5811.
113. See Table I, supra note 84.
114. Treas. Reg. § 6a.103A-2(f)(3)(1982). An issuer may rely on his own calcula-
tions if they are more accurate or comprehensive. Id. § 6a.103A-2(f)(5).
115. The purchase price safe harbor limitations for SMSAs throughout the country
are published periodically by the I.R.S. In 1981, the first purchase price safe harbor
limits were published. Rev. Proc. 81-36, 1981-2 C.B. 589. The most recent safe
harbor limitations (Rev. Proc. 83-5, 1983-4 I.R.B., 17-20) are for the period begin-
ning December 29, 1982 and ending December 31, 1983.
116. CBO 1980 REPORT, supra note 4, at 39. The safe harbor figures for previously
occupied homes range from lows of: $36,700 in parts of New York; $35,800 in parts
of Indiana; $36,400 in parts of Pennsylvania; and $41,800 in parts of Nebraska; to
highs of: $101,900 in Washington D.C.; $110,000 in Hawaii; and $96,200 in parts of
Texas. The figures for new homes range from lows of: $49,100 in parts of Arizona;
$54,600 in parts of Delaware; $55,500 in Iowa; $51,900 in parts of Maryland and
$51,800 in parts of Pennsylvania; to highs of $143,400 in parts of California;
$152,900 in parts of Connecticut; $127,700 in Hawaii; $110,500 in parts of Michi-
gan; $120,000 in parts of New York; $123,000 in parts of Ohio, and $102,000 in parts
of Texas. See Rev. Proc. 83-5, 1983-4 I.R.B. 17-20. See also Table I, supra note 84
(breakdown of the range in safe harbor limitations among the SMSA's in each state;
figures are reported separately for new and previously occupied residences).
117. Treas. Reg. § 6a.103A-2(f)(4)(ii)(A)-(B)(1982). See, e.g., Rev. Proc. 81-36,
1981-2 C.B. 590-91; Rev. Proc. 83-5, 1983-4 I.R.B. 19-20.
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In the past, safe-harbor figures have not proven to be the most
realistic estimate of actual average area purchase prices.118 These
figures are often inconsistent with actual home buying experience.11
For instance, the difference between safe-harbor purchase price for
new and previously occupied homes would appear to be far too large
in some areas 20 and far too small in others. 12 1 If limits are set too low,
moderate income persons in need of tax-exempt financing may be
unable to purchase a suitable home that is otherwise readily available
in the market. If set too high, lower income purchasers may be
crowded out of the marketplace by moderate income purchasers.
Consequently, the subsidy may sometimes be denied to those individ-
uals who need it most.12 2
5. Income Limitations
The Act imposes no income limitations on the homebuyers. 123 Nev-
ertheless, most states who have single-family programs had imposed
them well in advance of the Act's passage. 2 4 The range of income
limitations is usually expressed either as a percentage of state median
118. Safe Harbor Rules Released; Variances Could Cause Problems, 9 Hous. &
DEv. Rm,. (BNA) 243 (Aug. 17, 1981) [hereinafter cited as Safe Harbor Rules Re-
leased]. States may rely on their own statistical information for setting limits if they
feel their information is more accurate. Treas. Reg. § 6a.103A-2(f)(5)(1982). This is
an expensive proposition, however, and in some states the data is not available. Safe
Harbor Rules Released, supra, at 244 (the cost could be as high as $100,000). State
calculations are also subject to challenge by the I.R.S.
119. Safe Harbor Rules Released, supra note 118, at 244. This article contains
comments by state housing agency officials citing specific examples of the inaccura-
cies of safe harbor limitations. One Washington, D.C. bond attorney pointed out
that the methodology used to arrive at these figures is much weaker than that used to
calculate mortgage market volume (for state volume limitations). Id. at 243. See note
70 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the methodology used to calculate
state volume limitations.
120. See, e.g., the safe-harbor limitations for the states of: Alaska, Florida, Idaho,
Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, New Mexico, New
York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Texas and Wisconsin. Table I, supra note 84.
121. See, e.g., the safe-harbor limitations for the states of Delaware, Maine, New
Hampshire, North Dakota, South Dakota, Vermont, Virginia and Wyoming. Id.
122. Safe Harbor Rules Released, supra note 118, at 243. Another problem is that
metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas are often grouped together when there is
insufficient data to form a separate determination for each. Id. As a result, figures
are higher than needed in some rural areas and lower than needed in some urban
areas. Id.
123. Although originally included in the House bill, the Conference agreement
deleted all income requirements. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1479, 96th Cong., 2d Sess.
172, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs 5903, 5926.
124. See Table I, supra note 84, for a survey of state income limitations.
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income' 2 5 or as an absolute dollar figure.12 6 Sometimes there is an
additional limitation on the amount of net assets that a borrower may
own.' 7 This figure is usually adjusted depending upon the size of the
family. 128
IV. The Sunset Provision
The most controversial provision of the Mortgage Subsidy Bond Tax
Act is its "sunset provision." 129 As of January 1, 1984, the sunset
provision eliminates the tax-exempt status of all single-family mort-
gage revenue bonds.130 Unless Congress takes action to extend or
repeal the provision all single-family housing bonds, with the excep-
tion of veterans' bonds, issued after that date will be taxable securities.
The Supreme Court has specifically prohibited federal taxation of
interest income paid on state and municipal bonds.' 3' Therefore, the
constitutionality of any single-family bond regulation under the Mort-
gage Subsidy Bond Tax Act is questionable, since those bonds which
do not comply with its provisions are subject to taxation. ' 32 The focus
125. See, e.g., CALIFORNIA HOUSING FINANCE AGENCY, PRELIMINARY OFFICIAL
STATEMENT 12 (Oct. 1, 1982) (for a one person household, 120% of the median
county income, for two and three person households, 135 % of the median and 150 %
for four persons or more); WISCONSIN HOUSING FINANCE AUTHORITY, PRELIMINARY
OFFICIAL STATEMENT 14 (Dec. 1, 1982) (borrower or couple may not have a com-
bined income of over 125 % of the median annual income of county where borrower
resides).
126. See Table I, supra note 84.
127. See, e.g., ALASKA HOUSING FINANCE CORP., OFFICIAL STATEMENT 16 (Sept. 9,
1982); COLORADO HOUSING FINANCE AUTHORITY, OFFICIAL STATEMENT 12 (July 29,
1982) (net worth); NORTH CAROLINA HOUSING FINANCE AGENCY, OFFICIAL STATE-
MENT 10 (Nov. 12, 1981).
128. See, e.g., ARKANSAS HOUSING DEVELOPMENT AGENCY, OFFICIAL STATEMENT
14 (July 27, 1982) ($2,000 added for each dependent); CONNECTICUT HOUSING Fi-
NANCE AUTHORITY, OFFICIAL STATEMENT 11 (Sept. 10, 1982) (income limits range
from $24,000 to $40,200 depending on family size).
129. I.R.C. § 103A(c)(1)(B)(Supp. V 1981); Treas. Reg. § 6a.103A-2(a)(2)(1982).
130. Id. See notes 19-20 supra and accompanying text.
131. See discussion at notes 147-72 infra and accompanying text.
132. See Keohane, The Mortgage Subsidy Bond Tax Act of 1979: An Unwarranted
Attack on State Sovereignty, 8 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 483, 492-505 (1980). The author
contends that the regulation of mortgage subsidy bonds is unconstitutional. In addi-
tion, the article takes the position that amendments to § 103 of the Internal Revenue
Code limiting exemptions for IDBs and arbitrage bonds are unconstitutional. Id. at
505; 1981 Hearing, supra note 1, at 181-84 (statement of A.L. McNitt, Administrator
of Nevada Housing Division) (the State of Nevada feels that there is sufficient
probability that the Act is unconstitutional).
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of this section, however, is on the constitutionality of the sunset
provision and whether Congress has the power to completely elimi-
nate single family mortgage revenue bonds.13 3 Even if the possibility
exists that some regulation of single family bonds is constitutionally
justifiable, 34 it does not necessarily follow that the power of regula-
tion may be exercised in such a manner as to eliminate the tax-exempt
status of all single family mortgage revenue bonds. In order to deter-
mine whether Congress possesses the authority to eliminate these
bonds, it is necessary to examine the constitutional doctrine of inter-
governmental tax immunity.
A. Development of the Doctrine of Intergovernmental
Tax Immunity
The concept of governmental tax immunity was introduced by the
Supreme Court to protect federal instrumentalities from state taxa-
tion. 3 5 In McCulloch v. Maryland,136 the Court held that a state may
not tax those means employed by the national government to execute
133. A discussion of whether any regulation of single-family mortgage revenue
bonds is constitutionally justifiable, or alternatively, the extent to which regulation
might be permitted, is beyond the scope of this Comment.
134. Recent decisions of the Supreme Court recognize that there may be situations
where "the nature of the federal interest advanced may be such that it justifies state
submission" to federal regulation. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclama-
tion Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 288 n.29 (1981); National League of Cities v. Usery, 426
U.S. 833, 852-53 (1976)("The limits imposed upon the commerce power when Con-
gress seeks to apply it to the states are not so inflexible as to preclude temporary
enactments by the federal government tailored to combat a national emergency.");
Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 548 (1975) (federal Act temporarily freezing the
wages of state and local government employees was constitutional as "an emergency
measure to counter severe inflation that threatened the national economy"). Further-
more, since the Mortgage Subsidy Bond Tax Act was enacted by representatives from
the 50 states, the operation of the political process would be relevant to any judicial
review of the proper scope of a state's immunity from federal taxation. Although in a
commerce clause context, the Supreme Court rejected the notion that the operation
of the political process precludes the judicial review of a federal regulation imposed
upon the operation of states as states, National League, 426 U.S. at 841 n. 12, perhaps
the Court will not be as quick to accommodate challenges to federal regulations in
the area of intergovernmental tax immunity. In Massachusetts v. United States, 435
U.S. 444 (1978), the Court stated that: "The Congress, composed as it is of members
chosen by state constituencies, constitutes an inherent check against the possibility of
abusive taxing of the states by the National Government." Id. at 456.
135. See notes 137-38 infra and accompanying text.
136. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
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its vested constitutional powers.' 7 The Court in this decision relied
heavily upon the supremacy clause of the United States Constitu-
tion. 138
Collector v. Day'39 expanded this doctrine of governmental immu-
nity establishing a reciprocal state immunity from federal taxation,
co-extensive with that enjoyed by the national government.' 40 The
Court noted that the existence of states as sovereign entities predated
the adoption of the Constitution.' 4' The instrument assumes that
states will continue to exist and to perform their traditional sovereign
functions.' 42 Without limitations on the power of the national govern-
ment to tax, the Court feared that the ability of states to perform their
traditional sovereign functions could be destroyed. '43 Although the
Constitution contains no express prohibition against intergovern-
mental taxation, the immunity of state and federal governments from
taxation by each other has been upheld as a necessary implication of
the Constitution.' 44
137. Id. at 436. If states could tax the instruments employed by the federal
government to carry out its powers, they could paralyze its essential activities. Id. at
436-37. State governments in their zeal to represent their constituency might use
taxing power to operate to the disadvantage of the national government whose
interests they do not represent. Id. at 428-31.
138. Id. at 433-36. The supremacy clause states: "This Constitution, and the Laws
of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties
made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the
supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound there-
by...." U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
The Court consistently upheld the right of the federal government to be exempt
from state taxation on the basis of the supremacy clause. Panhandle Oil Co. v. Knox,
277 U.S. 218, 221-22 (1928); California v. Pacific R.R. Co., 127 U.S. 1, 41 (1887);
Bank of Commerce v. New York City, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 620, 631-33 (1862); Dobbins
v. Commissioner of Erie County, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 434, 448-49 (1842); Weston v.
City Council, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 448, 467 (1829); Osborn v. Bank of United States, 22
U.S. (9 Wheat.) 737, 866-67 (1824).
139. 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 113 (1870). The Supreme Court held that the salary of a
State judge was immune from federal income taxation.
140. "[T]he States within the limits of their powers not granted, or, in the lan-
guage of the tenth amendment, 'reserved,' are as independent of the general govern-
ment as that government within its sphere is independent of the States." Id. at 124.
141. Id. at 126.
142. Id. at 124-26.
143. Id. at 126-28. "The power of taxation contains the power to destroy." Id. at
127. This concept was introduced in McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 431.
144. "[T]he exemption rests upon necessary implication, and is upheld by the
great law of self-preservation; as any government, whose means employed in con-
ducting its operations, if subject to the control of another and distinct government,
can exist only at the mercy of that government." Collector v. Day, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.)
at 127; see McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 426.
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As the doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity developed, an
initially expansive scope of governmental immunity was extended by
the Court to activities that were intimately connected with the exer-
cise of a governmental power or the performance of a governmental
duty.1 45 During the most expansive period of the doctrine's develop-
ment, immunity was accorded to individuals and private interests
standing in close relationship with one government if the tax of an-
other government resulted in any economic burden being passed on to
the non-taxing sovereign.1 46 Intergovernmental tax immunity was
later narrowed as will be discussed in the next two subsections of this
Comment.
B. The Scope of Immunity for Governmental Obligations
Some of the earliest decisions in the area of intergovernmental tax
immunity established the principle that governmental obligations is-
sued by one sovereign were not taxable by the other. 147 In Weston v.
City Council,148 the Court held that a city's personal property tax
imposed on federal obligations was unconstitutional. "The tax on
145. Indian Motorcycle Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 570, 579 (1931) (sale of a
motorcycle to a municipal corporation for use in its police service); Ambrosini v.
United States, 187 U.S. 1, 8 (1902) (state surety bonds issued for the purpose of public
protection); Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 585-86 (1895)
(interest derived from state and municipal obligations not subject to federal tax);
United States R.R. Co., 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 322, 333 (1872) (municipal corporation
not subject to federal taxation upon its revenues); Dobbins v. Commissioner of Erie
County, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 434, 449 (1842) (salary or emoluments of a United States
officer not taxed); Weston v. City Council, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 448, 469 (1829) (federal
obligations sold to raise public funds not taxed).
146. Brush v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 352 (1937) (salary of chief engineer of a
municipal water system not subject to federal income taxation); New York ex rel.
Rogers v. Graves, 299 U.S. 401, 408-09 (1936) (salary paid to officer of federal
railroad corporation exempt from state tax); Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi ex tel.
Knox, 277 U.S. 218, 222 (1928) (state privilege tax could not be measured by the
number of gallons of gasoline sold to the United States); Williams v. City of Talla-
dega, 226 U.S. 404, 419 (1912) (voiding state privilege tax which made no exemption
for telegraph business carried on by an agency of the federal government); Collector
v. Day, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 113, 124 (1870) (salary of state judge immune from
federal taxation).
147. Bank Tax Case, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 200, 210 (1864) (stock of United States not
subject to taxation by the State of New York); Bank of Commerce v. New York City,
67 U.S. (2 Black.) 620, 622 (1862) (bank capital invested in United States securities
not subject to state taxation); Weston v. City Council, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 448, 469
(1829) (see text accompanying notes 148-49 infra); Merchantile Bank v. New York,
121 U.S. 138, 162 (1887) (see text accompanying notes 150-51 infra).
148. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 448 (1829).
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government stock is thought by this court to be a tax on the contract,
a tax on the power to borrow money on the credit of the United
States ... ." 149 Later, in Merchantile Bank v. New York,' 50 a recipro-
cal tax immunity was extended to state and municipal obligations.
The Court stated in dictum that state bonds were not taxable by the
federal government. 151
Shortly thereafter, the Court decided the pivotal case regarding the
tax immunity of interest earned on state and municipal obligations. In
Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co.,' 52 the Supreme Court held that
the United States government could not tax the interest paid on state
and municipal bonds.' 53 Adopting an approach of form over sub-
stance, 5 4 the Court determined that a tax imposed upon these secur-
ities was a tax upon their source (the state), and therefore repugnant
to the Constitution.' 55
It is contended that although the property or revenues of the states
or their instrumentalities cannot be taxed, nevertheless the income
derived from state, county, and municipal securities can be taxed.
But we think the same want of power to tax the property or
revenues of the state or their instrumentalities exists in relation to a
tax on income from their securities .... [T]axation on interest
therefrom would operate on the power to borrow before it is exer-
cised. . .[T]he tax in question is a tax on the power of the States
and their instrumentalities to borrow money, and consequently
repugnant to the Constitution.15
In addition to this determination, Pollock invalidated a part of the
first income tax law which provided for the levying of taxes upon rents
and income from real estate. 157 The tax was imposed in violation of
the constitutional rule of apportionment.' 58 To overcome this obstacle
of apportionment, Congress enacted the sixteenth amendment, which
gave the federal government the right to tax income "from whatever
149. Id. at 469.
150. 121 U.S. 138 (1887).
151. Id. at 162.
152. 157 U.S. 429 (1895).
153. Id. at 586.
154. Id. at 581.
155. Id. at 586. The Court followed the rationale used in a series of previous
decisions which had held that taxes imposed upon various individuals and activities
were actually taxes upon their source. Id. at 581-82.
156. Id. at 585-86.
157. Id. at 583, aff'd on reh'g, 158 U.S. 601 (1895).
158. Id.
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source derived." 5 Some representatives of state and local govern-
ments opposed passage of the amendment because they feared that it
would provide the federal government with the power to tax interest
paid on the bonds they issued. 16 0 In response to this opposition, several
members of Congress publicly stated that the amendment did not
increase the scope of the federal government's tax power. 16 ' Subse-
159. The sixteenth amendment states that: "The Congress shall have power to lay
and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment
among the several States, and without regard to any census or enumeration." U.S.
CoNsT. amend. XVI.
Prior to the passage of the sixteenth amendment, Congress' power to tax was
already unlimited and complete. Pacific Co. v. Soule, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 443 (1868).
"The taxing power is given in the most comprehensive terms. The only limitations
imposed are: That direct taxes, including the capitation tax, shall be apportioned;
that duties, imposts, and excises shall be uniform; and that no duties shall be imposed
upon articles exported from any State. With these exceptions, the exercise of the
power is, in all respects, unfettered." Id. at 446 (emphasis deleted). Accord Nichol v.
Ames, 173 U.S. 509, 515 (1899); Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 533, 540
(.1869). Notwithstanding this full and complete power, however, the Supreme Court
consistently recognized the fact that the Federal government was prohibited from
taxing the property and revenues of instrumentalities of a State. Pollock v. Farmers'
Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895) (federal government may not tax interest
from municipal securities); Merchantile Bank v. New York, 121 U.S. 138, 162 (1887)
(bonds issued under the authority of the State of New York are not taxable by the
United States); United States v. Railroad Co., 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 322, 332 (1873) (a
municipal corporation is a part of the sovereign power of the state, and may not be
subjected to federal taxation upon its revenues); Collector v. Day, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.)
113, 124 (1870) (Congress has no power to levy a tax upon the income of state
judges); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 429 (1819) (subtracted
from the Constitution's full grant of power of taxation is the right of the separate
sovereignties to perform their functions as such).
160. Governor Hughes of New York was perhaps the most vociferous opponent of
the amendment. He feared that it would bestow upon Congress the power to tax
income paid to holders of state and municipal bonds. 45 CONG. REC. 2245 (1910)
(quoting Gov. Hughes' address before the New York Legislature).
161. "My own judgement is that the words ...[from whatever source derived]
neither add to nor take away from the power of the Government to reach the
incomes of the country .. " 45 CONG. REC. 1699 (1910) (statement of Sen. Brown,
who sponsored the sixteenth amendment in Congress); "To construe the proposed
amendment so as to enable us to tax the instrumentalities of the State would do
violence to the rules laid down by the Supreme Court for a hundred years, wrench
the whole Constitution from its harmonious proportions and destroy the object and
purpose for which the whole instrument was framed." Id. at 1698 (statement of Sen.
William Borah of Idaho).
The objection made to the amendment is that this will confer upon the
National Government the power to tax incomes derived from bonds issued
by the States. . . .I do not find in the amendment any such meaning or
effect. I do not consider that the amendment in any degree whatever will
enlarge the taxing power of the National Government or will have any
effect except to relieve the excercise of that taxing power from the require-
ment that the tax shall be apportioned among the several States.
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quent decisions by the Court confirmed this view and emphasized that
the amendment was enacted to deal only with the apportionment
problem created by the Pollock decision. 6 2
A series of cases, decided after Pollock, have struck down thinly
disguised income taxes imposed by one sovereign upon the debt secur-
ities of another. 1 3 In Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Co. v.
Wisconsin,14 the Court invalidated a three percent license fee tax on
every dollar of interest earned from United States bonds as a direct
imposition upon the bonds themselves. 65 In National Life Insurance
Co. v. United States,166 the Court rejected a method of taxing life
insurance companies which effectively negated the advantage of mu-
nicipal bond ownership.16 7 The taxing method had reduced the com-
pany's allowable reserve deductions by the amount of income the
company derived from exempt securities. 6 8 As a result, the company's
tax burden was the equivalent of what it would have been had it
owned no tax-exempt bonds. 6 9 The Court in National Life articulated
Id. at 2539 (statement of Sen. Elihu Root of New York). See also McGee, Exemption
of Interest on State and Municipal Bonds, in HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS,
86TH CONG., 1ST SESS., 1 TAx REVISION COMPENDIUM 737, 738-40 (Comm. Print
1959) (legislative background to passage of sixteenth amendment).
162. Evans v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245, 261 (1920) ("In other words, the purpose of the
[Sixteenth] Amendment was to eliminate all occasion for such an apportionment
because of the source from which the income came, a change in no wise affecting the
power to tax but only the mode of exercising it."); Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S.
189, 206 (1920) (the sixteenth amendment "did not extend the taxing power to new
subjects, but merely removed the necessity which otherwise might exist for an appor-
tionment among the States of taxes laid on income" ); Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R.
Co., 240 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1916) ("It is clear on the face of this text that [the sixteenth
amendment] does not purport to confer power to levy income taxes in a generic sense
• , , the whole purpose of the Amendment was to relieve all income taxes when
imposed from apportionment .. "); Stanton v. Baltic Mining Co., 240 U.S. 103,
112 (1915) ("provisions of the Sixteenth Amendment conferred no new power of
taxation but simply prohibited the previous complete and plenary power of income
taxation possessed by Congress" ).
163. Missouri v. Gehner, 281 U.S. 313 (1930) (see notes 171-72 infra and accom-
panying text); National Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 277 U.S. 508 (1928) (see text
accompanying notes 166-70 infra); Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Wisconsin,
275 U.S. 136 (1927)(see text accompanying notes 164-65 infra).
164. 275 U.S. 136 (1927).
165. Id. at 141. See also Macallen Co. v. Massachusetts, 279 U.S. 620, 634 (1929)
(amendment removing excise tax exemption for United States bond income is in-
valid); Long v. Rockwood, 277 U.S. 142, 145 (1928) (royalties received from patents
issued by the United States are immune from state taxation).
166. 277 U.S. 508 (1928).
167. Id. at 519.
168. Id. at 516.
169. Id. at 519.
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the principle that "[o]ne may not be subjected to greater burdens upon
his taxable property solely because he owns some that is [tax] free." 170
In a similar decision, the Court in Missouri v. Gehner 71 held that a
state could not compensate for lost revenues by denying insurance
companies that held tax-exempt government securities the full value
of deductions granted other companies who were not holders.172
1. Limitations on the Scope of the Immunity
The Pollock decision was the Supreme Court's last opportunity to
consider directly the taxability of interest paid on state and municipal
obligations. Other more recent decisions have applied the immunity
doctrine in the area of indirect municipal bond taxation,173 but none
have considered the taxability of interest paid on these obligations.
One of the earliest cases to uphold the indirect taxation of government
obligations was Flint v. Stone Tracy. 174 In Flint, the Court upheld a
federal franchise tax, imposed on private businesses, that included the
use of income from state and municipal obligations to measure the
amount of business transacted within the state. 7 5 The Court recog-
nized that although a direct ownership tax placed upon tax-exempt
property was invalid, a privilege tax may be measured by a corpora-
tion's property, even though part of that property is derived from
sources that are not taxable. 76
Another series of cases decided shortly after Pollock upheld taxes on
the transfer of ownership of state and municipal obligations. Willcuts
v. Bunn 177 held that profits from the sale of these obligations were
taxable, regardless of their governmental character, because a tax on
gains imposed no burden upon a state's borrowing power.7 7 The
170. Id.
171. 281 U.S. 313 (1930).
172. Id. at 321-22. See Schuylkill Trust Co. v. Pennsylvania, 296 U.S. 113, 119-20
(1935) (state tax law discriminated against federal securities in favor of state secur-
ities).
173. United States v. Atlas Life Ins. Co., 381 U.S. 233 (1965) (see text accompany-
ing notes 184-89 infra); Denman v. Slayton, 282 U.S. 514 (1931) (discussed at notes
180-83 infra and accompanying text); Willcuts v. Bunn, 282 U.S. 216 (1931) (dis-
cussed at notes 177-79 infra and accompanying text); Flint v. Stone Tracy, 220 U.S.
107 (1911) (see text accompanying notes 174-76 infra).
174. 220 U.S. 107 (1911).
175. Id. at 165.
176. Id. at 162-64. See also Home Ins. Co. v. New York, 134 U.S. 594 (1890)
(upholding state privilege tax measured by dividends of corporation's capital stock
which included investments in United States bonds).
177. 282 U.S. 216 (1931).
178. Id. at 227-29. The Court stated that "[t]he power to tax is no less essential
than the power to borrow money, and, in preserving the latter, it is not necessary to
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Court stated that before the power of Congress to tax could be denied,
the burden placed upon the state's borrowing power must be "real,
not imaginary; substantial, not negligible." 179
In Denman v. Slayton,'8 0 the Court upheld an Internal Revenue
Code provision eliminating interest expense deductions for money
borrowed to finance tax-exempt securities. ' 8' The Court distinguished
Denman from its earlier decision in National Life on the grounds that
the tax in Denman did not impose any increased burden upon the
purchaser "solely because he was the recipient of interest from tax-free
securities .... " 18s2 Denman merely prevented a person who was pur-
chasing tax-exempt securities with taxable income from escaping taxa-
tion from both sources. 18 3
In 1965, the Supreme Court in United States v. Atlas Insurance
Co. 84 upheld provisions in the Life Insurance Company Income Tax
Act of 1959185 that allocated the tax-exempt interest on policy reserves
between life insurance companies and their policy holders. 8 This had
the effect of increasing the insurance company's share of taxable
cripple the former by extending the constitutional exemption from taxation...
where no direct burden is laid upon the governmental instrumentality . I. " d. at
225. The Court found the sale of bonds by their owners after issuance to be a distinct
transaction from the issuance of the bonds and, therefore, not inseparably connected
with the exercise of state borrowing power. Id. at 227-29.
179. Id. at 234. The transaction in question in Wilicuts was a transfer of title and
not a transaction made on behalf of the state. Id. at 229. This case was consistent
with earlier decisions by the Court allowing each sovereign to place a transfer tax on
obligations of the other passing by legacy. See Greiner v. Llewellyn, 258 U.S. 384
(1922) (federal estate tax valid as applied to municipal bonds included in an estate);
Plummer v. Coler, 178 U.S. 115 (1900) (upheld New York inheritance tax imposed
upon bequest of United States bonds). In these instances the subject of taxation is the
transfer and the property is only a convenient measuring device. See Comment,
Intergovernmental Tax Immunities: An Analysis and Suggested Approach to the
Doctrine and its Application to State and Municipal Bond Interest, 15 VILL. L. REV.
414, 421 (1970).
180. 282 U.S. 514 (1931).
181. Id. at 519-20. In a later decision, the Court referred to this as the principle
that tax-exempt financing must "pay its own way." United States v. Atlas Life Ins.
Co., 381 U.S. 233, 247 (1965). This was a reference to the prohibition on the practice
of deducting from federal income tax interest payments on money borrowed to
finance tax-free obligations.
182. 282 U.S. at 519.
183. Id. at 520. The Court pointed out that an individual with an income of
$10,000 from taxable securities could, by purchasing exempt securities with bor-
rowed money and paying $10,000 interest thereon, escape taxation upon revenues
from both sources. Id.
184. 381 U.S. 233 (1965).
185. Pub. L. No. 86-69, 73 Stat. 112 (1959).
186. 381 U.S. at 247.
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income. 8 7 As a result, the Company was prevented from obtaining
both the full benefit of the tax-exempt income and a full deduction for
policy reserves. 188 The Court held that the tax burden imposed by the
Act was permissible since purchasers of tax-exempt securities "are
[not] constitutionally entitled to reduce their tax liability and to pay
less tax per taxable dollar than those owning no such securities."189
In each of the cases discussed in this section, the Court never
wavered from its holding in Pollock. Any burden placed upon a
government issuer as a result of the imposition of taxes was indirect
and did not increase its cost of borrowing funds. Therefore, the taxes
imposed placed no direct burden upon a sovereign's borrowing power,
before that power was exercised. Accordingly, none of these decisions
provide authority for a direct tax upon income derived from single-
family mortgage revenue bonds, which would obstruct state and local
borrowing power before it is exercised. Indeed, these decisions sup-
port a prohibition of such a tax.
C. The Scope of Immunity for Other State Activities
The Supreme Court has been more active in narrowing the scope of
intergovernmental tax immunity in other areas of governmental activ-
ity. These decisions are of limited relevance to this discussion since
they neither descend from the principle set forth in Pollock, nor
involve in any respect the taxation of governmental obligations. 90
Nevertheless, the decisions are examined in order to ascertain to what
extent, if any, they have eroded the scope of intergovernmental tax
immunity. Has the doctrine degenerated to a point where the taxation
of interest paid on single-family revenue bonds is constitutionally
permissible?
1. Upon Whom Does the Burden Fall?
One traditional limitation on the scope of immunity has been im-
posed when individuals or private interests, rather than states, are the
main beneficiaries of tax immunity. Prior to the decisions discussed in
this section, the Court had provided immunity whenever a tax im-
posed by one sovereign would increase expenses realized by the
187. Id. at 238.
188. Id. at 251.
189. Id.
190. See Keohane, supra note 132, at 499. The decisions discussed in this Section
do not address the issue of taxation of state or municipal bonds. The extent to which
they are relevant to the exercise of a state's borrowing power is uncertain. Id.
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other. 19' This standard was replaced by one which evaluates whether
a particular tax falls directly upon the government by measuring the
degree to which the tax imposes an economic burden upon the sover-
eign.
In James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 9 2 the Court upheld a two
percent tax imposed by West Virginia upon the gross receipts collected
by a private contractor from the federal government. The fact that
the tax increased the cost to the federal government did not alone
invalidate it. 9 3 In Helvering v. Gerhardt,9 4 the immunity extended
to governmental salaries9 5 began to recede as the Court denied a
federal tax exemption to the employees of the Port Authorities of New
York and New Jersey.19 The Court stated that the advantage derived
by the state from this exemption was too speculative and uncertain to
support a claim of constitutional immunity from taxation.9 7 The
decision recognized that some burdens must pass between sovereigns,
and focused upon the degree of burden placed upon the non-taxing
sovereign.9 8 For immunity to extend to a private person dealing with
the government, the resulting tax burden placed upon the state must
be substantial. 199
191. See notes 145-46 supra and accompanying text.
192. 302 U.S. 134 (1937).
193. Id. at 160. The Court acknowledged the existence of a delicate balance
between the freedom to perform essential governmental functions and unduly re-
stricting the power to tax. Id. at 150.
194. 304 U.S. 405 (1938).
195. See Brush v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 352 (1937) (salary of chief engineer of
municipal water system not subject to federal income taxation); New York ex tel.
Rogers v. Graves, 299 U.S. 401 (1936) (discussed at note 146 supra); Collector v.
Day, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 113 (1870) (discussed at notes 139-44 supra and accompany-
ing text); Dobbins v. Commissioner of Erie County, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 434 (1841)
(salary or emoluments of United States officer not taxable by state).
196. 304 U.S. at 424. Shades of the supremacy doctrine reappeared as Justice
Stone stated that: "[A]ny allowance of a tax immunity for the protection of state
sovereignty is at the expense of the sovereign power of the nation to tax. Enlargement
of the one involves diminution of the other." Id. at 416. The Court reasoned that
when immunity is invoked by a private citizen, it operates to his benefit at the
expense of the taxing sovereign. Id. at 416-17.
197. Id. at 421-22.
198. Id. at 422. This doctrine was first set forth in Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell,
269 U.S. 514, 523-24 (1926), where the Court held that the salaries of independent
consultants derived from a contract with the state were not exempt from federal
income tax.
199. Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405, 421 (1938) (see notes 194-98 supra and
accompanying text); Helvering v. Mountain Producers Corp., 303 U.S. 376 (1938)
("immunity from non-discriminatory taxation sought by a private person for his
property or gains because he is engaged in operations under a government contract or
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In Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe,20 0 the Supreme Court
overruled Collector v. Day20 by holding that the state may validly
impose a tax on the salary of an employee of a congressionally created
corporation. 2  The Court stated that the uncertain economic tax
burden placed upon the state did not justify a private individual being
clothed in immunity.20 3
Graves also rejected the theory used by the Pollock Court that a tax
on income is a tax on its source. 20 4 Some advocates of the complete
abolition of municipal tax-exemptions suggest that this finding extends
to the taxation of interest derived from those obligations. It is their
contention that since Graves determined that a tax on income is not a
tax on its source, it therefore follows that a tax on income from
interest paid on state and municipal obligations would not be a direct
tax upon its source-the state. 205 Rather, the tax would be imposed
upon the individual bondholders. Graves has particular significance
to those who urge reversal of the Pollock principle, because the deci-
lease cannot be supported by merely theoretical conceptions of interference with the
functions of government" ). Id. at 386.
200. 306 U.S. 466 (1939).
201. 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 113 (1870).
202. Graves, 306 U.S., at 484-86. Graves also overruled other earlier cases which
had held that the salary of an officer of one government or its instrumentality is
immune from taxation by the other. See note 195 supra. The Court stated that:
So much of the burden of a non-discriminatory general tax upon the
incomes of employees of a government . . . as may be passed on economi-
cally to that government .. .is but the normal incident of the organiza-
tion within the same territory of two governments, each possessing the
taxing power. The burden . . . is one which the Constitution pre-
supposes...
Id. at 487.
203. Id. at 486.
204. Id. at 480. See Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 585-86
(1895) (discussed at notes 154-56 supra and accompanying text). Supreme Court
decisions prior to Graves had determined that immunity of the source does not
necessarily extend immunity to income derived from that source. New York ex rel.
Cohn v. Graves, 300 U.S. 308, 312-16 (1937) (state may tax income received from
rents on lands situated in another state); Hale v. State Bd. of Assessment and Review,
302 U.S. 95, 108 (1937) (excise tax not laid upon bonds but on an aggregate of
occupations and investments); United States Glue Co. v. Town of Oak Creek, 247
U.S. 321 (1918) (state tax upon income from interstate commerce is constitutional).
205. Ratchford, Intergovernmental Tax Immunities in the United States, 6 NAT'L
TAX J. 305, 323, 327 (1953) (contending that, since the theory of "a tax on income as
a tax on its source" is no longer tenable, the Supreme Court, if confronted with the
issue today, would be likely to sustain the taxability of interest from state and
municipal obligations); Kirby, State and Local Bond Interest, in HousE COMM. ON
WAYS AND MEANS, 86TH CONG., 1ST SESS., 1 TAX REVISION COMPENDIUM 679, 682-83
(Comm. Print 1959) (with the theory used in Pollock gone, practically nothing
remains to support the tax-exempt status of state and municipal obligations).
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sion reversed a similar principle based upon a long line of precedent
which had established that the income received by officials of one
sovereign was not taxable by the other.2 °0
In 1941, the Court, in Alabama v. King & Boozer,20 7 upheld a state
sales tax paid by contractors working under a cost-plus-fixed-fee con-
tract with the federal government. Although the burden of the tax
was passed on to the federal government, the Court applied a "legal
incidence" test to determine whether the state or federal government
should bear the cost of the tax.20 8 Under Alabama state law, the "legal
incidence" of the sales tax was to fall on the contractor and not the
federal government because the contractor was legally obligated to
pay the debt. 20 9
Commentators have also suggested that King & Boozer is damaging
to the immunity enjoyed by state and municipal obligations since it
allows the additional burden of a governmental tax to be passed
through to the non-taxing sovereign.21 0 In determining who would
206. See notes 195-96 supra and accompanying text. One commentator, arguing
against the validity of Pollock in light of Graves, states that to impose a tax upon
interest derived from state and local bonds would not discriminate against the
income derived from these obligations. The imposition of such a tax would merely
remove the exemption for bond income in the same way the Court in Graves
removed the exemption for governmental salaries. Ratchford, supra note 205, at 325.
207. 314 U.S. 1 (1941).
208. Id. at 9-14. Commentators often describe the approach taken by the Court in
King & Boozer as a legal incidence test which determines whether the imposition of a
state sales tax falls directly upon the government or upon a private interest. See L.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-29, at 297-98 (1978); Note, The Taxabil-
ity of State and Local Bond Interest by the Federal Government, 38 U. CIN. L. REV.
703, 708 (1969). The Court concluded that the imposition of the sales tax in question
fell upon the purchaser, as defined by state law. King & Boozer, 314 U.S. at 9-10. In
a cash sale the purchaser was determined to be the person who ordered and paid for
the goods. Id. In a credit sale, the purchaser was the person obligated to pay. Id. at
10.
In circumstances identical to those in King & Boozer, 13 years later the Court
found King & Boozer not controlling in Kern-Limerick, Inc. v. Scurlock, 347 U.S.
110 (1954). The Court struck down the application of a tax on a contract with the
United States which designated the contractor to be the purchasing agent of the
government. Id. at 122. It was acknowledged that the nation bore the same tax
burden in this instance as it did in King & Boozer when the United States was the
purchaser. Id. at 119.
209. Id. at 2. "The asserted right of the one to be free of taxation by the other does
not spell immunity from paying the added costs attributable to the taxation of those
who furnish supplies to the government and who have been granted no tax immu-
nity." Id. at 9.
210. See Ratchford, supra note 205, at 327 (noting the trend by the Court away
from the doctrine that taxes are unconstitutional merely because a burden is passed
on to the government); Kirby, supra note 205, at 683 (although the withdrawal of
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL
bear the burden from the taxation of interest earned on single-family
bonds, however, the "King & Boozer legal incidence test lacks logical
support." 211 None of the burden of an income tax on state or local
obligations would be realized by purchasers of single-family bonds.
Bond purchasers would benefit from increased interest payments of-
fered by issuers as compensation for the taxability of these bonds. The
burden of the tax would fall directly on state and local governments in
terms of increased borrowing costs which would have a strong impact
on the continued viability of these programs. In order to compete for
investors in the marketplace, yields offered by issuers of taxable single-
family bonds would have to be substantially higher than the yields
offered on securities that are tax-exempt. 212
Also, Gerhardt and O'Keefe suggest that for a finding of immunity
not only must the burden imposed upon the government be direct, but
also the benefit derived from the exemption must be provable. 213 The
benefit of tax-exemption realized by state and local government issu-
ers in terms of reduced borrowing costs is statistically provable by
computing the differential between the yields offered on taxable
bonds and those paid on bonds that are tax-exempt. Using this com-
parison, one can see that the burden imposed upon issuers by the
taxation of single-family bonds would be neither speculative nor un-
certain.
Finally, the burden imposed by the sales tax in King & Boozer was
negligible compared with that which would be imposed by the taxa-
tion of interest paid on single-family bonds. Nothing in King & Boozer
precludes the invalidation of a tax which imposes a severe burden on
the government. 21 4 A tax placed on single-family bonds would impose
a far more substantial burden than the one in Boozer. Increased
the exemption for interest would increase the borrowing costs of state and local
governments, the burden would be nondiscriminatory).
211. See Note, supra note 208, at 708 (generally criticizing the logic behind the
legal incidence test). See also L. TRUBE, supra note 208, § 6-29, at 397 ("extraneous
circumstances make King & Boozer's use of the legal incidence test less than a
compelling precedent").
212. See notes 9-10 supra and accompanying text.
213. See notes 194-204 supra and accompanying text. The burden may not be
speculative or uncertain.
214. The court in Graves, 306 U.S. at 480-81, also supported this postion and
cautioned against the imposition of taxes which would interfere with the perform-
ance of governmental functions. Even though the Court rejected the theory that a tax
on income is a tax on its source, the Court stated that "the only possible basis for
implying a constitutional immunity from state income tax on the salary of an em-
ployee of the national government or of a governmental agency is that the economic
burden of the tax is in some way passed on so as to impose a burden on the national
government tantamount to an interference by one government with the other in the
performance of its functions." Id. at 481.
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borrowing costs may very well preclude states from providing single-
family mortgage financing.21 5
2. Proprietary Functions
Another early exception to the doctrine of intergovernmental tax
immunity was recognized for proprietary activities conducted by
states for monetary gain. 216 These cases generally distinguish between
essential or traditional governmental functions and proprietary
ones.
2 17
215. See note 21 supra. The logic of using statistical data to measure the burden
placed upon state and local government issuers by the imposition of federal taxation
is supported by the Supreme Court's decision in National League of Cities v. Usery,
426 U.S. 833 (1976). In National League, the Court made extensive use of statistical
data to measure and demonstrate the financial burden that would be placed upon
states by the imposition of a federal minimum wage standard on state employers. Id.
at 846-48. The Court held that insofar as the 1974 amendments to the Fair Labor
Standards Act sought to regulate the wages and work hours of state employees, they
"operate to directly displace the States' freedom to structure integral operations in
areas of traditional governmental functions." Id. at 852. The Court feared that the
increased expense imposed by the standard would prevent states from supplying their
citizens with traditional governmental services. Id. at 849-51.
216. South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437 (1905) (see text accompanying
notes 218-20 infra); Allen v. Regents, 304 U.S. 439 (1938) (see text accompanying
notes 221-22 infra); Helvering v. Powers, 293 U.S. 214 (1934); Ohio v. Helvering.
292 U.S. 360 (1934) (see note 219 infra).
217. Two recent decisions of the Court provide insight into the issue of traditional
functions in the context of conflicting interests between the federal commerce clause
power and state sovereignty. In National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833
(1976) the Supreme Court stated that traditional governmental functions include:
"such areas as fire prevention, police protection, sanitation, public health, and parks
and recreation." Id. at 851. The list provided by the Court was not exhaustive. Id. at
851 n.16. In United Transp. Union v. Long Island R.R. Co., 102 S. Ct. 1349 (1982)
the Long Island Railroad's employees union sought a declaratory judgment that the
Railway Labor Act, and not the State Taylor Law, would govern the resolution of a
labor dispute between the union and the railroad. The Supreme Court held that
Congress' acknowledged authority to regulate labor relations in the railroad industry
does not so impair a state's ability to carry out its constitutionally preserved sovereign
function as to endanger its "separate and independent existence." Id. at 1356. The
Court rejected the argument that operation of a railroad engaged in interstate
commerce was an integral part of traditional state activities. Id. at 1354. Tht -
decisions are relevant to this analysis only to the extent that they define the activities
which will constitute essential state functions. The extent to which these holdings are
applicable to questions of intergovernmental tax immunity is uncertain. The Court
specifically qualified its decision in National League by stating that a different result
might occur "if Congress seeks to affect integral operations of state governments by
exercising authority granted it under other sections of the Constitution. ... Na-
tional League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 852 n. 17 (1976); see Hodel v. Virginia
Surface Mining & Reclam. Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 287 n.28 (1981).
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL
In South Carolina v. United States,218 the Court upheld federal
license taxes that were imposed upon a state liquor monopoly. The
fact that a state was participating in an activity normally conducted
by private enterprise did not eliminate that state activity from the
taxing power of the federal government. 2 9 The Court expressed con-
cern that states, by extending the scope of their functions, could
destroy the power of the national government to collect taxes. 220 In
Allen v. Regents of the University System of Georgia,221 the issue was
whether the federal government could impose an admissions tax on
athletic activities conducted by a state university. The Court held that
although the public educational system was essential to the state, a
nondiscriminatory tax laid on admissions to athletic events would not
violate the doctrine of immunity. 22
Although the tax burdens in South Carolina and Allen fell directly
upon the state, it was the essential characteristics of the functions
affected that were given primary consideration by the Court. In each
instance, the activity burdened by the tax was one that could have
been conducted by private enterprise, not one which was essential for
the state to carry on as a government entity.
The proprietary functions doctrine was modified somewhat in New
York v. United States.2 3 New York State claimed that bottling min-
eral water for sale was a "usual, traditional and essential governmen-
tal function. '22 4 The Court rejected the above strict proprietary func-
tions test22 5 as inflexible and suggested a new standard of evaluation
for state activities.
218. 199 U.S. 437 (1905).
219. id. at 463. See Helvering v. Powers, 293 U.S. 214, 227 (1934) (salary of a
trustee of a state railway company not exempt from federal income taxation); Ohio v.
Helvering, 292 U.S. 360, 369 (1934) (federal excise tax may be imposed upon state
liquor monopoly).
220. 199 U.S. at 455-57.
221. 304 U.S. 439 (1938).
222. Id. at 452.
223. 326 U.S. 572 (1946).
224. Id. at 574. The Court stressed the recent shift in emphasis towards limitations
on immunity. Id. at 581. The decision recognized a need for some taxation between
sovereigns since the spheres of both national and state governments had expanded
into new fields of activity unknown by the founding fathers. Id. at 579.
225. Id. at 583. Earlier in the decision, the Court had expressed its dissatisfaction
with the current standard. "To rest the federal taxing power on what is 'normally'
conducted by private enterprise in contradiction to the 'usual' governmental func-
tions is too shifting a basis for determining constitutional power and too entangled in
expediency to serve as a dependable legal criterion." Id. at 580.
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[S]o long as Congress generally taps a source of revenue by whom-
soever earned and not uniquely capable of being earned only by a
State, the Constitution of the United States does not forbid it
merely because its incidence falls also on a State.
26
Although mortgage lending is a taxable activity normally con-
ducted by private enterprise, it does not necessarily follow that state
and local single-family mortgage subsidy bond programs are taxable
proprietary functions. They are distinguishable from that line of cases
on two grounds. First, these programs are not activities conducted for
the purpose of monetary gain. 22 7 Second, to the extent that these
programs provide loans to persons who could not otherwise afford a
conventional mortgage loan, they do not supplant an otherwise tax-
able activity being conducted by private enterprise. Accordingly, sin-
gle-family mortgage bond programs are not taxable as a proprietary
function.
V. Conclusion
Periodic increases in interest rates and a tight money supply have
prevented private enterprise from supplying adequate housing for
persons of low and moderate incomes. At the same time, the federal
government has eliminated much of the housing subsidies that had
previously enabled HFAs to be active in the construction of multi-
family rental housing.2 28 As a result, state housing finance agencies
226. Id. at 582. The extent to which this test revised the Court's philosophy of the
proprietary function doctrine is uncertain. All justices taking part in the decision
agreed that not all of the former immunity was gone. Id. at 584 (Rutledge, J.,
concurring); id. (Stone, J. concurring) (joined by Justices Reed, Murphy and Bur-
ton); id. at 586 (Douglas, J., dissenting, joined by Black, J., dissenting); id. at 590.
At least six of the nine justices explicitly disagreed with language in the majority
opinion that suggested that Congress might impose any tax upon states that was not
discriminatory. "[W]e are not prepared to say that the national government may
constitutionally lay a non-discriminatory tax on every class of property and activities
of States and individuals alike." Id. at 586 (Stone, J., concurring) (joined by Justices
Reed, Murphy and Burton); "If ... any federal tax on any state activity were
sustained unless it discriminated against the State, then a constitutional rule would
be fashioned which would undermine the sovereignty of the states as it has been
understood throughout our history." Id. at 592 (Douglas, J., dissenting, joined by
Black, J. dissenting).
227. See Keohane, supra note 132, at 502 (mortgage loan program is not profit-
making enterprise). The Act provides that any excess profit earned by the issuer must
be paid to the federal government or to bond-holders. See notes 62-63 supra and
accompanying text.
228. J. PECHMAN, SETTLING NATIONAL PrIUorUTIES, THE 1983 BUDGET 11 (1982)
(most programs providing aid to cities have been cut or eliminated in the 1983
budget).
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have been forced to place an increased emphasis on their single-family
mortgage programs in order to provide affordable housing for their
low and moderate income citizens.
The vast majority of state courts have determined that the use of
mortgage revenue bonds to finance housing for its citizens serves a
public purpose and justifies the issuance of public debt. 2 9 State legis-
latures have determined that the activities of state housing finance
agencies serve an essential governmental function. 230 Single-family
bonds are an integral element of the formula prescribed by state
229. Walker v. Alaska State Mortgage Ass'n, 416 P.2d 245, 251-53 (Alaska 1966);
California Hous. Fin. Agency v. Elliott, 17 Cal. 3d 575, 582-86, 551 P.2d 1193,
1197-1200, 131 Cal. Rptr. 361, 365-68 (1976); In re Interrogatories by Colo. State
Senate, 193 Colo. 298, 306-08, 566 P.2d 350, 356-57 (1977); Rich v. State, 237 Ga.
291, 292, 227 S.E.2d 761, 764 (1976); John R. Grubb, Inc. v. Iowa Hous. Fin. Auth.,
255 N.W.2d 89, 93-98 (Iowa 1977); Maine State Hous. Auth. v. Depositors Trust
Co., 278 A.2d 699, 705 (Me. 1971); Massachusetts Hous. Fin. Agency v. New
England Merchants Nat'l Bank, 356 Mass. 202, 211-14, 249 N.E.2d 599, 605-07
(1969); In re Act No. 346 of Public Acts of 1966, 380 Mich. 554, 567-85, 158 N.W.2d
416, 420-30 (1968) (advisory opinion); Minnesota Hous. Fin. Agency v. Hatfield, 297
Minn. 155, 166-72, 210 N.W.2d 298, 305-08 (1973); Huber v. Groff, 171 Mont. 442,
446-49, 558 P.2d 1124, 1126-28 (1976); State ex rel. Douglas v. Nebraska Mortgage
Fin. Fund, 204 Neb. 445, 456, 283 N.W.2d 12, 20-23 (1979); New Jersey Mortgage
Fin. Agency v. McCrane, 56 N.J. 414, 420-22, 267 A.2d 24, 27-28 (1970); Martin v.
North Carolina Hous. Corp., 277 N.C. 29, 42-52, 175 S.E.2d 665, 672-78 (1970); In
re Denial of Approval to issue $30,000,000.00 of Single Family Housing Bonds, 307
N.C. 52, 296 S.E.2d 281, 284-87 (1982); Johnson v. Pennsylvania Hous. Fin. Agency,
453 Pa. 329, 337-40, 309 A.2d 528, 532-34 (1973); Opinion to the Governor, 112 R.I.
151, 153-56, 308 A.2d 809, 810-12 (1973); Bauer v. South Carolina State Hous.
Auth., 271 S.C. 219, 227-31, 246 S.E.2d 869, 873-75 (1978); West v. Tennessee
Hous. Dev. Agency, 512 S.W.2d 275, 279-80 (Tenn. 1974); Utah Hous. Fin. Agency
v. Smart, 561 P.2d 1052, 1053-54 (Utah 1977); Vermont Home Mortgage Credit
Agency v. Montpelier Nat'l Bank, 128 Vt. 272, 276-78, 262 A.2d 445, 448-49 (1970);
Infants v. Virginia Hous. Dev. Auth. 221 Va. 659, 669-73, 272 S.E. 2d 649, 655-57
(1980); State ex rel. West Virginia Hous. Dev. Fund v. Copenhaver, 153 W.Va. 636,
644-49, 171 S.E.2d 545, 550-53 (1969); State ex rel. Warren v. Nusbaum, 59 Wis. 2d
391, 413-23, 208 N.W.2d 780, 795-800 (1973).
230. ALASKA STAT. § 18.56.010(e) (1981) (purchase of mortgage loans essential to
economic growth of state); CoLo. REV. STAT. 129-4-702(1) (1977) (essential that state
issue revenue bonds to assist critical housing needs); IOWA CODE ANN. § 220.2.1
(West Supp. 1982-1983) (housing finance authority performs public and essential
governmental functions); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 12-5200 (i) (1982) ("the issuance of
revenue bonds pursuant to this act [is] in the public interest and constitutes essential
governmental functions of cities and counties of the state"); MONT. CODE ANN. § 90-
6-102 (1981) (issuance of mortgage revenue bonds essential to meet critical housing
needs); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:1B-7 (a) (Supp. 1982-1983) (mortgage finance agency
performs an essential governmental function of the state); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-18-
2(F) (1982) (mortgage finance authority performs essential public functions); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 122A-2 (1981) (housing finance agency performing an essential govern-
mental function); TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 12691-6, § 3a (Vernon Supp. 1982-
1983) (performance of all duties by State Housing Agency held to be an essential
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legislatures to remedy critical housing shortages. Due to changes in
our society, economy, and political philosophy, these bonds have
become no less essential than those used in multi-family programs.
The decisions to prohibit the federal government from taxing the
income derived from state and municipal obligations was last pro-
claimed by the Supreme Court in 1895,231 yet its vitality remains
intact. This exemption 232 has been one of the most enduring features
of our income tax law since 1913.233 Recently, a trend has developed
toward restricting the use of tax-exempt financing for certain pur-
poses.2 34 The constitutionality of all these restrictions is questionable.
It appears certain, however, that the sunset provision of the Mortgage
Subsidy Bond Tax Act, which provides for the elimination of tax-
exempt single-family revenue bonds, is unconstitutional.
Geoffrey W. Sager
governmental function); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 611(a) (Supp. 1982) (state finance
agency performs a public and essential governmental function).
231. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895).
232. I.R.C. § 103 (1976).
233. Revenue Act of 1913, Pub. L. No. 38-16, ch. 16, § 2, 38 Stat. 114, 168
(1913). See also Graetz, Implementing a Progressive Consumption Tax, 92 HARv. L.
REV. 1575, 1630 (1979); Ratchford, supra note 205, at 319.
234. In 1968, Congress imposed limitations on industrial development bonds.
Revenue and Expenditure Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-364, § 107(a), 82 Stat.
251, 266-68 (1968) (codified at I.R.C. § 103(b) (1976)). Restrictions were placed on
arbitrage bonds in 1969. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 601, 83 Stat.
487, 656-57 (1969) (codified at I.R.C. § 103(c) (1976)). The Mortgage Subsidy Bond
Tax Act of 1980 limits the use of industrial development bonds for low and moderate
income rental housing (discussed at note 16 supra) and severely restricts the use of
single-family mortgage revenue bonds. See notes 51-63 supra and accompanying text.
The Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, reprinted
in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS (Supp. No. 7) contains a sunset provision for
all small issue IDBs. Id. § 214(c), reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at
146 (codified at I.R.C. § 103(b)(6) (West Supp. No. 3 1982)) and restricts the
purposes for which they can be issued in the interim. Id. § 214(a), reprinted in 1982
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 145-46 (codified at I.R.C. § 103(b)(6)(k-0) (West.
Supp. No. 3 1982)).
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